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I. Introduction
On July 6, 2016, Niantic, Inc. released Pokémon Go, a mobile
app for iOS and Android devices. 1 The premise of this game is that
players locate and interact with virtual creatures, known as
Pokémon.2 However, unlike traditional video games, which allow
1. See Pokémon Go, POKÉMON CO., http://www.pokemon.com/us/pokemonvideo-games/pokemon-go/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (providing an overview of
Pokémon Go) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Clara Ferreira-Marques, Pokémon Game Adds $7.5 Billion to
Nintendo Market Value in Two Days, REUTERS (July 11, 2016),
http://reut.rs/29wIhiJ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“[Pokémon Go], which marries
a classic 20-year old franchise with augmented reality, allows players to walk
around real-life neighborhoods while seeking virtual Pokémon game characters
on their smartphone screens—a scavenger hunt that has earned enthusiastic
early reviews.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Nick
Wingfield & Mike Isaac, Pokémon Go Brings Augmented Reality to a Mass
Audience, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2016), http://nyti.ms/29CGXJr (last visited Sept.
21, 2017) (“In the case of Pokémon Go, players traverse the physical world
following a digital map, searching for cartoon creatures that surface at random.
People look through their smartphone cameras to find Pokémon.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Dave Thier, What Is ‘Pokémon GO,’ And
Why Is Everybody Talking About It?, FORBES (July 11, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidthier/2016/07/11/facebook-twitter-social-whatis-pokemon-go-and-why-is-everybody-talking-about-it/#12ad69fc1758 (last visited
Sept. 21, 2017) (“[Pokémon Go] takes place in a world full of Pokémon, monsters
of various sizes that can be captured in tiny red balls and tamed by Pokémon
trainers, who use them to fight.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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players to interact with virtual characters in virtual settings,
Pokémon Go is an augmented reality game that places virtual
characters in real world settings using a mobile device’s GPS and
camera capabilities. 3 In short, Pokémon Go was designed to
transform a player’s world for purposes of game play. Based upon
its immediate popularity, Pokémon Go has also transformed the
world of video games as well. 4 In doing so, this app has created a
number of new legal issues that implicate a variety of different
areas, including criminal law, privacy law, property law, and tort
law.5
Review).
3. See David E. Fink & Jamie N. Zagoria, VR/AR in a Real World, ENT. &
SPORTS LAW., Fall 2016, at 2 (“For the uninformed, Pokémon Go is a game that
uses the player’s smartphone camera and augmented reality to insert virtual
Pokémon (fictitious creatures) into the user’s real world.”); Cristin Wilson, How
Can Employers Reduce the Risk of Pokémon Go?, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 1, 2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/pokemon_go_at_work (last visited
Sept. 21, 2017) (“[Pokémon Go] is indeed a phenomenon . . . . The app works in
conjunction with the GPS on your phone, and the goal is for users to capture the
virtual characters they see around them.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Larry N. Zimmerman, Pokémon Go, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Sept. 2016, at
10 (“The app is GPS-connected and your onscreen avatar moves on a Google map
as you walk the streets of your city, burg, or village searching . . . . A tracker
vaguely points to nearby Pokémon requiring you to walk and explore until the
monsters finally pop up onscreen.”).
4. See Ferreira-Marques, supra note 2 (“In the United States, by July 8—
two days after its release—[Pokémon Go] was installed on more than 5 percent of
Android devices in the country, according to web analytics firm SimilarWeb.”);
Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 10 (“Pokémon Go is the biggest mobile game release
in U.S. history, attracting more users than Twitter within just three days of its
release on July 6 of this year.”); Wingfield & Isaac, supra note 2 (“Pokémon Go
represents one of those moments when a new technology—in this case,
augmented reality or A.R., which fuses digital technology with the physical
world—breaks through from a niche toy for early adopters to something much
bigger.”).
5. See Tamara Chuang, Playing Pokémon Go? Here’s How to Stay Safe,
DENVER POST (July 15, 2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/07/15/pokemongo-safety-online/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“By now, you’ve probably heard of
the new mobile game craze Pokémon Go. And perhaps you’ve heard there were
some privacy concerns—like the app requiring full access to a user’s Google
account for those who chose to sign into the game using Google. Those were real.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Joseph Rothberg, ‘Pokémon
GO’ Field Guide: What You Need to Know About Civil Trespass Laws, FORBES
(July 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2016/07/21/afield-guide-to-civil-trespass-in-the-age-of-pokemon-go/#75e0c5236b6f
(last
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Technology invariably creates new legal questions of how to
apply existing law to new circumstances. As Pokémon Go
evidences, courts, lawmakers, and commentators are often forced
to struggle with how to address these new issues hurriedly after
they arise. In such instances, developers, platform owners, and
users encounter a great deal of uncertainty regarding the
lawfulness of their behavior and potential liability.
This Article is designed to educate, explore, and analyze when
and how federal securities regulation applies to video games,
virtual worlds, virtual reality, and augmented reality, i.e.,
securities that exist entirely within virtual space. “Virtual space”
is a term coined within this Article to designate any software
created environment, including the virtual elements of augmented
reality. It can be as simple as a virtual chess board for a game of
chess or as complex as a well-developed virtual reality simulator.
Although it is highly unlikely that federal securities regulation
applies to Pokémon Go, what that game demonstrates is how
quickly issues related to video games, virtual worlds, virtual
reality, and augmented reality can appear and how useful it can
be for developers and platform owners to comprehend the potential
legal concerns before unleashing their creations into the world.
Securities regulation is an important area of law to understand
prior to a developer creating, distributing, and marketing any type
of virtual experience that has investment-related aspects to it that
are tied to real world currency. This application of securities law
to virtual space is developing, and the question is more one of how
the law ought to apply, rather than how it does apply, because the
case law and commentary is so sparse.
This is not to claim that securities regulators have never found
their jurisdiction extending into cyberspace. Initially, as the
Internet came into being, regulators struggled with questions of
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“Since its launch, excited players have been venturing into
closed public spaces after hours and even trespassing onto private properties in
order to catch Pokémon and advance in the game. There have been multiple
reports by home and business owners of players trespassing . . . .”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 10–11 (“The
vast library of . . . stops in the game represents real places—some of them
memorials, businesses, and even residences that did not ask to participate and do
not want the traffic . . . . [T]raffic near sites also creates risks of trespass,
vandalism, or disturbance from groups of players arriving to play.”).
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how to apply securities regulation when it was used as a means of
communication. 6 In recent years, however, the Internet has
become an omnipresent tool in the purchasing and selling of
securities. 7 As a result, in many instances, investors can now feel
assured that their investments are at least somewhat protected by
state and federal securities regulation as it has evolved to address
securities issues online. 8 This is not the case, however, when it
6. See Anita Indira Anand, Securities Law in the Internet Age: Is
“Regulating by Analogy” the Right Approach?, 27 QUEEN’S L.J. 129, 136 (2001)
(“[R]egulators have struggled with how to integrate the Internet into concepts
currently embedded in securities law.”); Roberta S. Karmel, Regulatory Initiatives
and the Internet: A New Era of Oversight for the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 33 (2002) (“The trading of
securities over the Internet has challenged securities regulators to adjust old legal
constructs to fit this new medium.”); Lawrence J. Trautman & George P.
Michaely, Jr., The SEC & The Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit, 68
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 262, 262 (2014) (“The Internet has created challenges
for regulators of financial markets unimagined over eighty years ago by drafters
of the Securities and Exchange Acts.”).
7. See Tamar Frankel, The Internet, Securities Regulation, and Theory of
Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1319, 1319–20 (1998) (“The Internet affects the
environment in which securities markets operate and the laws that govern them.
The use of the Internet has already begun to change the way information about
securities is disseminated and the way securities are traded, two activities
regulated by the securities laws.”); Constance Z. Wagner, Securities Fraud in
Cyberspace: Reaching the Outer Limits of the Federal Securities Laws, 80 NEB. L.
REV. 920, 920 (2001) (“More and more securities activities in both the primary
and the secondary markets are moving on-line these days.”).
8. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Securities Regulation of Private Offerings in
the Cyberspace Era: Legal Translation, Advertising and Business Context, 37 U.
TOL. L. REV. 331, 331–32 (2006) (“What is often termed the cybersecurities era
refers to the process by which securities regulation has been translated to
changing technological and business practices in the last two decades,
particularly since the advent of the Internet.”); Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: A Failed Vision for Increasing
Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in International
Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1437 (2011) (“The United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) . . . has demonstrated little concern
about broadening its reach to cover securities transactions occurring online, even
in the absence of an edict from Congress to do so.”); Michael L. Rustad, Punitive
Damages in Cyberspace: Where in the World is the Consumer?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 39,
105 n.402 (2004) (“Similarly, the SEC has been active in extending federal
securities law to the enforcement of predatory, anti-fraud and anti-competitive
practices in cyberspace. SEC actions may be brought for insider trading, pyramid
schemes, fraudulent investment opportunities, and false and misleading
information about securities and the companies that issue them.”).
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comes to securities existing entirely within the virtual space of
video games, virtual worlds, virtual reality, and augmented
reality. While securities regulation may extend into these realms,
the case law is limited, and the legal commentary is meager at
best.9
Regarding securities existing entirely within virtual space,
this Article argues that securities law likely could be applied in
these settings based upon the definition of “security” found within
Section 2(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 3(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.10 Based on the language found
within both of these sections—which limits the application of this
definition of a security if “the context otherwise requires”—
however, regulators and courts should determine that these
securities existing entirely within virtual space, which are
dependent on virtual activity, are not securities for purposes of
federal securities regulation. 11 As will be explained below,
eliminating the application of the federal securities law is the
correct solution because of the intended scope of federal securities
regulation, various constitutional law principles, and concerns
about hindering creativity and regulatory experimentation.12
This Article advances the existing scholarship in three main
ways.13 First, this Article thoroughly explores the multiple ways in
9. Notably, in July 2017, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) issued a report stating that certain cryptocurrencies could be
subject to federal securities regulation, if they met the definition of a security.
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Exchange Act Release No, 81207 (July 25, 2017). In issuing the report,
the SEC stated that the cryptocurrency in the matter was offered and sold by a
“virtual organization” known as “The DAO.” Id. at 1. Although this is an
interesting development in securities regulation in cyberspace, the SEC report in
no way resolves the issue presented in this paper because it did not involve
securities existing within virtual space, i.e., video games, virtual worlds, virtual
reality, and augmented reality.
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2012).
11. Id. §§ 77b(a), 78c(a).
12. See infra Part V (providing arguments for not applying federal securities
regulation to securities existing entirely within virtual space).
13. Remarkably, the issues of when or how federal securities regulation in
the United States applies to transactions in virtual worlds has been largely
ignored in the existing legal scholarship and other commentary. The major
published pieces on the topic consist of a book chapter and a student comment.
See BENJAMIN TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW: NAVIGATING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE

SECURITIES REGULATION IN VIRTUAL SPACE

1393

which securities can interact with virtual space, whereas the very
limited previous scholarship focuses mainly on virtual securities
in virtual worlds. 14 This Article is designed to be a foundational
piece about how securities can relate to virtual space, which is
defined to include a wide variety of environments existing within
video games, virtual worlds, virtual reality, and augmented
reality. Second, this Article updates the very limited prior
scholarship in light of the recent enactment of the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). 15 The JOBS Act amended
various portions of the Securities Act to allow for expanded
purchases and sales via the Internet and mandated that the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopt a
number of rules and regulations regarding the online purchase and
sale of securities. 16 The JOBS Act may potentially have an impact
on when and how federal securities laws apply to transactions in
virtual space. Third, this Article offers a new solution to regulation
of securities existing entirely within virtual space, i.e., to exclude
them from the coverage of the federal securities law, and to allow
other regulation to govern. Although federal securities regulation
could apply to these securities, this is not the best means of
regulating these realms. Unlike the previous limited scholarship,
this Article argues that based upon the intended scope of federal
securities regulation, various constitutional law principles, and
concerns
about
hindering
creativity
and
regulatory
experimentation, a strong case exists for determining that
securities existing entirely within virtual space should not be
subject to federal securities law. 17
OF VIRTUAL WORLDS

217–24 (2008) (exploring the consequences of cash economies
within virtual worlds and the growth of virtual markets). See generally Shannon
L. Thompson, Comment, Securities Regulation in a Virtual World, 16 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 89 (2009) (exploring the consequences of virtual securities within virtual
worlds such as the game “Second Life”).
14. See DURANSKE, supra note 13, at 217 (analyzing how securities
regulation interact with virtual worlds); Thompson, supra note 13, at 98 (“[T]his
Article examines whether virtual world securities are, in fact, securities subject
to regulation under the federal securities laws.”).
15. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
16. Id.
17. See infra Part V (providing arguments for not applying federal securities
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The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II
provides background on virtual space and its many forms including
video games, virtual worlds, virtual reality, and augmented
reality, and Part III offers a brief primer on federal securities
regulation. 18 Part IV offers an analysis of how federal securities
regulation might interact with securities existing entirely within
virtual space and concludes that the virtual context should
preclude the application of federal securities law. 19 Part V provides
various arguments in support of that position based upon the
intended scope of federal securities regulation, various
constitutional law principles, and concerns about hindering
creativity and regulatory experimentation.20 Part VI addresses
various counterarguments in favor of applying federal securities
regulation, including that the application of federal securities
regulation is necessary for investor protection, is required to
prevent an unworkable patchwork of state regulation, and is
needed to ensure that these rapidly developing and evolving
virtual environments are properly regulated. 21 Finally, Part VII
offers brief concluding remarks. 22
II. A Brief Primer on Video Games, Virtual Worlds, Virtual
Reality, and Augmented Reality
The term “virtual space” has been coined specifically for this
Article. Within this paper, “virtual” is defined using the popular
definition of “being on or simulated on a computer or computer
network . . . such as . . . of, relating to, or existing within a virtual
reality.” 23 Virtual space designates any software-created
environment, including the virtual elements of augmented reality.
regulation to securities existing entirely within virtual space).
18. Infra Parts II, III.
19. Infra Part IV.
20. Infra Part V.
21. Infra Part VI.
22. Infra Part VII.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/
23. Virtual,
M ERRIAM-WEBSTER,
dictionary/virtual (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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Virtual space entails a wide variety of realms including video
games, virtual worlds, virtual reality, and augmented reality.
Virtual space can designate everything from a simple video game
chess board to a complex virtual reality environment. This space is
different from cyberspace, although the two are closely related.
Cyberspace designates “the online world of computer networks and
especially the Internet.” 24 Although virtual space and cyberspace
do overlap in most instances, virtual space does exist beyond the
world of networked computers. For example, an individual could
create a computer with a video game, virtual reality experience, or
augmented reality experience that is not networked with any other
computer and is not in any way connected to the Internet. This
virtual space would exist separate and apart from cyberspace.
Thus, as used in this Article, virtual space is expansive, and it
encompasses many different realms, including video games,
virtual worlds, virtual reality, and augmented reality.
A. Exploring Virtual Space
Although an exhaustive discussion of video games, virtual
worlds, virtual reality, and augmented reality is beyond the scope
of this Article, a few words ought to be said about these media in
which virtual space can exist. The vast majority of readers will
have some familiarly with these media, but some discussion of
their pervasiveness will demonstrate that it is a question of when,
rather than if, securities regulation issues will arise in virtual
space.
Video games are electronic games that allow a player to
interact through a user interface with images on a video screen,
such as a television or video monitor. 25 The first patent for a video
24. Cyberspace, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/cyberspace (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
25. See
Video
Game,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/video%20game (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (defining the
term “video game” as “an electronic game played by means of images on a video
screen and often emphasizing fast action”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see also Jethro Dean IV, Comment, Would You Like to Play Again?
Saving Classic Video Games from Virtual Extinction Through Statutory
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game was filed by Thomas T. Goldsmith Jr. and Estle Ray Mann
on January 25, 1947, and it was issued on December 14, 1948. 26
During the 1950s and 1960s, video games were developed mainly
for purposes of research, public displays, and instructional
purposes, and they did not become popular until the 1970s and
1980s when video arcade games and video gaming consoles became
widely available.27 During the 1990s, the development of the
Internet and reduced cost of home computers helped to fuel the
growth of video games. Today, video gaming is a
multi-billion-dollar industry with a multitude of different games
available. 28 The amount and types of virtual space available within
video games is substantial.
During the 2000s, the video game industry popularized a
specific genre of virtual space known as virtual worlds. 29 The term
Licensing, 35 SW. U. L. Rev. 405, 406 (2006) (“Originally, video game ROM files
were fixed on memory boards installed inside large arcade cabinets that were
primarily designed to hold the video monitor and controls.”).
26. Cathode-Ray Tube Amusement Device, U.S. Patent No. 2,455,992 (filed
Dec. 14, 1948).
27. See Christian Genetski & Christian Troncoso, Copyright Industry
Perspectives: The Pivotal Role of TPMS in the Evolution of the Video Game
Industry, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 359, 359 (2015) (“Although there is considerable
debate about the industry’s precise birthdate, most point to the early- to
mid-1970s as the point at which video games entered into the mainstream
consciousness.”).
28. See Andrew E. Jankowich, Property and Democracy in Virtual Worlds,
11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 173, 175 (2005) (“Through widespread public adoption
of the Internet in the 1990s, the increasingly mainstream appeal of video games,
and continuing increases in computer power, the evolution of sophisticated
virtual worlds became possible.”); Jonathan M. Etkowicz, Comment, Professional
Athletes Playing Video Games—The Next Prohibited “Other Activity?”, 15 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 65, 79 (2008) (“Additional technological advancements in the
1990s ushered in the modern age of video games.”).
29. See Christopher J. Cifrino, Virtual Property, Virtual Rights: Why
Contract Law, Not Property Law, Must Be the Governing Paradigm in the Law of
Virtual Worlds, 55 B.C. L. REV. 235, 240 (2014) (“Virtual worlds have exploded in
popularity over the past decade.”); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The End of the (Virtual)
World, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 57 (2009) (“Despite this rapid evolution, virtual
worlds have only truly entered the mainstream in the past decade with the
breakout success of Blizzard Entertainment’s World of Warcraft.”); Trevor J.
Smedley & Ross A. Dannenberg, Enforceability of Machine Patents in Virtual
Worlds, J. INTERNET L., Jan. 2010, at 7 (“With the development of massively
multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) employing 3D graphics in the
late 1990s and three-dimensional virtual worlds such as Second Life in the early
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“virtual world” designates an online, computer-created
environment that allows users to interact using avatars.30 An
avatar is a digital representation of the user that allows the user
to exist within the computer-created space. 31 These environments
allow users to feel as though they are present in a space separate
from the traditional world, which is why virtual worlds are worlds
unto themselves.32 These environments represent spaces in which
the application of “real world” law can be highly uncertain. As a
result, a number of law review articles have been authored
regarding the application of real world law to virtual worlds, 33
2000s, computer simulation has become part of mainstream culture and a
significant part of the real-world economy.”).
30. See GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 9 (2010) (“All virtual
worlds . . . are
Internet-based
simulated
environments
that
feature
software-animated objects and events.”).
31. See id. (“Users are represented in virtual worlds by ‘avatars,’ digital alter
egos that both embody and enable users within the simulated space.”).
32. See id. (“The social and interactive complexity of virtual worlds can be
substantial, making users feel like they are truly ‘present’ somewhere else. This
is why virtual worlds are truly called ‘worlds.’”).
33. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and
Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043 (2004); Marc Jonathan
Blitz, A First Amendment for Second Life: What Virtual Worlds Mean for the Law
of Video Games, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 779 (2009); Susan W. Brenner,
Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 11 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 1 (2008); Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing
Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2007); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Avatar
Experimentation: Human Subjects Research in Virtual Worlds, 2 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 695 (2012); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual
Worlds Govern Everyday Life, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 55 (2012); Joshua A.T.
Fairfield, Nexus Crystals: Crystallizing Limits on Contractual Control of Virtual
Worlds, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 43 (2011); Jon M. Garon, Beyond the First
Amendment: Shaping the Contours of Commercial Speech in Video Games,
Virtual Worlds, and Social Media, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 607; Jon M. Garon, Playing
in the Virtual Arena: Avatars, Publicity, and Identity Reconceptualized Through
Virtual Worlds and Computer Games, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 465 (2008); Greg
Lastowka, User-Generated Content and Virtual Worlds, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 893 (2008); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual
Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2004); Leandra Lederman, “Stranger Than Fiction”:
Taxing Virtual Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1620 (2007); Juliet M. Moringiello, What
Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 159 (2010); John William
Nelson, A Virtual Property Solution: How Privacy Law Can Protect the Citizens of
Virtual Worlds, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 395 (2011); Tyler T. Ochoa, Who Owns
an Avatar? Copyright, Creativity, and Virtual Worlds, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 959 (2012); Kevin W. Saunders, Virtual Worlds—Real Courts, 52 VILL. L. REV.
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although the discussion of the application of securities regulation
to this virtual space has been minimal.34
In addition, virtual reality is another popular technology for
generating virtual space. Virtual reality refers to the use of
software to generate realistic images, sounds, and other sensations
to create a virtual environment.35 Although virtual reality has a
substantial history, this medium for virtual space has been
particularly hot in the past few years based upon the widespread
availability of virtual reality headsets. 36 As a result, virtual reality
has become increasingly popular, including with academics, who
have begun to explore the legal issues associated with it. 37
187 (2007); Theodore P. Seto, When Is a Game Only a Game?: The Taxation of
Virtual Worlds, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027 (2009); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Sex Play
in Virtual Worlds, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1127 (2009).
34. See supra note 13 (discussing the very limited scholarship addressing the
application of securities regulation to virtual worlds).
35. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom of 3D Thought: The First
Amendment in Virtual Reality, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2008) (“[A]nother
kind of electronic environment . . . is more all-encompassing. It does not merely
claim a small piece of our perceptual field. It swallows it entirely. It is not simply
a virtual world on a screen—but a full-fledged virtual reality—a
three-dimensional space that we seem to be within.”); Gregory P. Joseph, Virtual
Reality Evidence, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 12, 12 (1996) (“‘Virtual reality’ refers
to a category of computer-generated simulations—generally three-dimensional
animations—that are designed to place the viewer in a simulated environment
that reacts in a visually appropriate fashion to the viewer’s actions.”); Natalie
Salmanowitz, Unconventional Methods for a Traditional Setting: The Use of
Virtual Reality to Reduce Implicit Racial Bias in the Courtroom, 15 U. N.H. L.
REV. 117, 138 (2016) (“[V]irtual reality is broadly defined as any technology in
which the user experiences and interacts with a virtual environment, commonly
(but not necessarily) through the perspective of an avatar.”).
36. See Fink & Zagoria, supra note 3, at 1 (“[T]he headsets through which
the world of virtual reality can be accessed, have been or will be made available
for sale to the public this year, such as Facebook-owned Oculus VR’s Oculus Rift,
Samsung’s Gear VR, Sony’s PlayStation VR, HTC’s Vive, etc. In other words,
VR/AR is going mainstream.”).
37. See Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience 2.0, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1043,
1073 (2016) (“Virtual Reality . . . is now being explored for an incredible range of
uses . . . . Regulators, legislators, practicing attorneys, and scholars have already
begun to weigh in on issues such as intellectual property, privacy, and
constitutional law.”); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality,
and Augmented Reality 2 (Mar. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2933867 (last visited Sept.
21, 2017) (“AR and VR both present legal questions for courts, companies, and
users. Some are new takes on classic legal questions. People will die using AR and
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As discussed above, augmented reality, based on the
popularity of Pokémon Go, is also a hot medium for virtual space. 38
This is true despite augmented reality having existed for roughly
half a century.39 Typically, augmented reality places virtual
characters and objects in real world settings using a mobile
device’s GPS and camera capabilities. 40
In short, virtual space is plentiful and constantly evolving. As
a result, now is the time to discuss how legal issues might arise in
this space before these issues appear and end up being addressed
haphazardly.
B. Securities Solely Existing in Virtual Space
Securities regulation issues could easily find—and in many
cases already have found—their way into virtual space. The best
way to illustrate how easily issues relating to securities solely
existing in virtual space could come into being is to consider the
following hypothetical:
Adam Anderson sits at a computer in his home office. Financial
newspapers and books on investing are piled high around him.
He reaches for the mouse to start his work, and he knocks over
his cup of coffee that he left on the edge of his desk. The cup’s

VR—indeed, some already have. They will injure themselves and others. Some
will use the technology to threaten or defraud others.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
38. See supra notes 1–5 and accompany text (providing an overview of
Pokémon Go and its popularity).
39. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The
Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 689 (2012) (“Augmented
reality has been developing for decades. In 1968, Ivan Sutherland created . . . the
first augmented reality system. The system consisted of a helmet with a digital
display that the user could wear to look around the room and see digital
information overlaid on the physical world.”).
40. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid Being Mapped):
Reconceiving First Amendment Protection for Information-Gathering in the Age of
Google Earth, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 128 (2012) (“[N]ew ‘augmented
reality’ applications for iPhones, Blackberries, and other smartphones
superimpose words or icons on images of the surrounding terrain . . . .”); Wilson,
supra note 28, at 1131–32 (“These ‘augmented reality’ technologies push virtual
experiences and object down into real space, erasing the boundary between the
virtual world and the real world.”).
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lukewarm contents splash onto his new pants. Anderson
mumbles a few inaudible words.
Anderson returns to staring at the screen. He checks the values
of his investments. A number of his stocks are performing very
well. He notices his stock in Global Giant Corporation has
dropped substantially based on claims of accounting
misstatements that spread across the Internet yesterday. With
a few keystrokes, his shares of Global Giant Corporation are
sold. He decides to use the profits to purchase shares of Pear
Inc., a computer company that has been promising the
announcement of a new and innovative smartphone. He
purchases 200 shares of Pear Inc., and he turns off the
computer.

Situations similar to the hypothetical above occur regularly
throughout the United States. When these events are occurring in
the “real world,” the application of federal securities regulation is
undeniable. The facts of this hypothetical, however, could easily be
incorporated into a video game, a virtual world, a virtual reality
experience, or an augmented reality experience.
If the hypothetical above occurs in a virtual space, investors
cannot currently feel assured that state and federal securities
regulation will apply because of the limited amount of case law and
other guidance regarding this issue. This is particularly troubling
because the ubiquity and anonymity of the Internet makes virtual
environments very well suited for fraud and other sorts of abusive
transactions.
III. A Brief Primer on Federal Securities Regulation
Although some readers of this Article will have an extensive
familiarity with federal securities regulation, a few words ought to
be said about the consequences of participating in transactions
involving securities for those readers who may not have spent a
significant amount of time studying such regulation. This Part is
not designed to be a comprehensive discussion of securities law.
Many important aspects of federal securities regulation that may
be applicable to virtual space will not be discussed within the pages
of this Part, including such topics as exchange regulation,
broker-dealer regulation, and investor adviser regulation. In
addition, this Part focuses only on federal securities regulation,
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rather than state securities regulation, even though such state
regulation may have important consequences in transactions
involving securities. 41 This Part is designed only to briefly
introduce securities regulation and to highlight the importance of
whether securities law is applicable to virtual space.
The current system of federal securities regulation in the
United States came into being during the first half of the twentieth
century. Prior to the development of federal securities law in the
United States, securities transactions were regulated by general
anti-fraud statutes that were supplemented in some instances by
privately imposed regulation on certain exchanges.42 Because
general anti-fraud provisions and private exchange regulation
proved ineffective to regulate securities markets, Kansas enacted
the first state securities act in 1911. 43 Within two decades, the vast
41. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Role of Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA
and the JOBS Act, 66 DUKE L.J. 605, 618 (2016) (“Blue sky laws have an
important role in the governance of capital formation. States generally retain
authority to make and enforce antifraud rules. States also retain significant
authority over registration, although as a result of preemption, states have in
recent years lost some authority in this area.”); Cheryl Nichols, H.R. 2179, The
Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2004: A Testament to
Selective Federal Preemption, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 533, 535 (2008)
(“The Commission cannot go it alone—there must be continued cooperation and
shared labor between the Commission and Blue Sky Administrators. Blue Sky
Administrators have an incredibly important role to play in ensuring that
individual investors and working people are treated fairly.”); Marc I. Steinberg,
Enhanced “Blue Sky” Enforcement: A Path to Help Solve Our Public School
Funding Dilemma, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 563, 571 (2011) (“[T]he states in their
enforcement of the blue sky laws are important to market integrity and investor
protection. The SEC needs help.”).
42. See Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An Evolutionary Model
for the Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Regulation,
79 U. CIN. L. REV. 587, 610 (2011) (“[Prior to the 1930s,] the United States
employed a privatization approach to securities regulation under which securities
exchanges determined rules governing issuers, investors, and other market
participants. In addition, general provisions of tort and criminal law were used to
prohibit fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.”).
43. See Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 983 n.9 (2015) (“Kansas is largely credited with enacting
the first blue sky law in 1911, which required companies selling securities in the
state, as well as stockbrokers, to register with the bank commissioner and disclose
information about their operations.”); Ronald J. Colombo, Merit Regulation Via
the Suitability Rules, 12 J. INT’L. BUS. & L. 1, 7 (2013) (“In 1911 Kansas enacted
the first law in America regulating the sale of securities—and by the Great
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majority of other states had enacted similar statutes, which
became commonly known as “blue sky laws.”44 The patchwork of
regulation created by these various state statutes proved
ineffective to prevent the stock market crash of 1929.45 In the wake
of the crash and the ensuing Great Depression, Congress passed
the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 46 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).47 Although various other
statutes regulate securities transactions within the United States,
the Securities Act and Exchange Act are the primary sources of
federal securities regulation. 48
Depression, every state had followed suit. The Kansas law, like many, was
enacted in response to widespread securities fraud in that state.”); Arthur B.
Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65
BUS. LAW. 395, 401 (2010) (“Starting with Kansas in 1911, most states passed
laws to protect investors from nefarious sales practices and other peculation in
the offer and sale of securities.”).
44. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
305, 312 (2015); (“Kansas passed the first Blue Sky law in 1911. Other states soon
joined and passed their own laws to protect their citizens from sellers of
fraudulent securities.”); Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding?
Social Networks and the Securities Laws—Why The Specially Tailored Exemption
Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1761 n.159
(2012) (“In 1911, Kansas enacted the first state securities act and other states
followed suit by enacting state securities laws that are commonly referred to as
blue sky laws.”); Ruth O. Kuras, Harmonization of Securities Regulation
Standards Between Canada and the United States, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 465,
466 (2004) (“The origin of modern securities regulation began in the state of
Kansas in 1911 with the passage of the first state securities legislation. This Act
was a prototype which other states soon followed.”).
45. See Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual
Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1376
(2013) (“[T]he New Deal Congress believed that state securities laws—known as
‘Blue Sky Laws’—had been ineffective in deterring abuses that contributed to the
Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression.”); Joel Seligman,
The Changing Nature of Federal Regulation, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 205, 207
(2001) (“In the brutal glare that followed the 1929–1932 stock market crash,
virtually all commentators and congressional witnesses on the subject agreed that
the blue sky laws never really had a chance to succeed.”); Robert E. Wagner, Too
Close for Comfort: The Problem with Stationary SEC Officers, 15 NEXUS: CHAP. J.
L. & POL’Y 91, 93 (2009) (“Before the creation of the SEC, states had enacted
so-called Blue Sky laws to control the sales of securities, beginning in 1911 with
Kansas. Nonetheless, these laws came to be viewed as ineffective.”).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).
47. Id. §§ 78a–78pp.
48. See Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality Issues in
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Federal securities regulation is, at its heart, business
investment regulation. To understand the significance of being
subject to federal securities law, this Part contains a discussion of
the breadth of the definition of a security, the registration
requirements for securities, and the broad scope of the anti-fraud
provisions within the Acts. This Part is designed to demonstrate
how quickly and easily someone can become subject to and violate
the federal securities laws. Even for attorneys, understanding
these laws can be a challenge. Securities law is a leading source of
malpractice claims against business lawyers.49
A. Definition of a Security
The definition of a security is a key issue under any system of
securities regulation because it determines the applicability and
scope of that system. Under federal securities law, the term
“security” is defined broadly and applies to a wide variety of
investments. 50
Disclosures that Require Investors to Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 PEPP. L. REV.
927, 931 (2007) (“The two main statutes making up federal securities law are the
Securities Act of 1933 . . . and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”);
Susanna Kim Ripken, Paternalism and Securities Regulation, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 1, 2 n.1 (2015) (“The two main sources of federal securities laws are the
Securities Act of 1933 . . . and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”); J. Parks
Workman, The South Carolina Uniform Securities Act of 2005: A Balancing Act
Under a New Blue Sky, 57 S.C. L. REV. 409, 411 (2006) (“The main sources of
federal securities regulation are the Securities Act of 1933 . . . , which regulates
the initial offering of securities, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . ,
which regulates the trading of securities subsequent to their initial issue.”).
49. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 396 (9th ed. 2015) (“[S]ecurities regulation issues
reportedly are the single most common source of legal malpractice claims against
business lawyers. Why? Put bluntly, because there are so many ways the lawyer
can go awry.”); Wilburn Brewer, Jr., Expert Witness Testimony in Legal
Malpractice Cases, 45 S.C. L. REV. 727, 754 (1994) (“To practice in the highly
technical areas such as medical malpractice and securities regulation,
practitioners must possess highly developed skills and knowledge.”); Lauren
Schulz & Michael Hunter Schwartz, Lawyer, Know your Safety Net: A Malpractice
Insurance Primer for New and Experienced Lawyers, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, March
2013, at 22 (“[A]reas of law that are high risk for malpractice claims include
intellectual property, patent, and securities law.”).
50. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (“[Congress] enacted
a definition of ‘security’ sufficiently broad to encompass virtually any instrument
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The term “security” is defined within the definition sections of
both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Section 2(a)(1) of the
Securities Act provides:
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock,
security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement,
collateral-trust
certificate,
preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on
any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase,
any of the foregoing. 51

Containing very similar language, Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange
Act provides:
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock,
security future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,
or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a
“security”; or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall
not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of
that might be sold as an investment.”).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
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grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise
limited. 52

Although the language of the two sections varies slightly,
courts have regularly held that the definitions are equivalent. 53
Any variation in language of the definitions is not significant in
determining whether federal securities regulation applies to
virtual space.
The definitions of a security found within Section 2(a)(1) of the
Securities Act and Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act include
some types of investments with narrow, well-settled definitions
and some types of investments with broad, more flexible
definitions. 54 Terms such as note, bond, and stock found within the
definitions of a security carried well-settled meanings when
Congress promulgated the Securities Act and Exchange Act.55
Terms such as investment contract, transferrable share, and “in
general any interest or instrument commonly known as a security”
were included to be more descriptive and broad enough to catch a
wide variety of investments within the scope of federal securities
regulation. 56
Although some of the other terms contained within the
definitions of a “security” found in the Securities Act and Exchange
Act may apply to securities existing entirely within virtual space,
this Article focuses on the term “investment contract” within both
52. Id. § 78c(a)(10).
53. See SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (noting that the Supreme
Court of the United States has treated the “slightly different formulations” of the
definition of a security found in Sections 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and 3(a)(10)
of the Exchange Act “as essentially identical in meaning”); Landreth Timber Co.
v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985) (holding that definitions of a security
found in Sections 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act
are “virtually identical and will be treated as such in [the Supreme Court’s]
decisions dealing with the scope of the term”); MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES
REGULATION 26 (rev. 5th ed. 2009) (noting that courts have interpreted the
definition of a security within Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Section
3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act “in an identical manner”).
54. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)
(discussing the definitions of a security found within Section 2(a)(1) of the
Securities Act and Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act).
55. See id. (“Some, such as notes, bonds, and stocks, are pretty much
standardized and the name alone carries well settled meaning.”).
56. Id.
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definitions. Although the definition of an “investment contract” is
not the same as the definition of a “security,” 57 the term
“investment contract” is a “catch-all” that includes a wide variety
of items that are considered securities. 58 Plus, the term
“investment contract” covers a wide variety of circumstances
involving non-traditional securities, making it an excellent
starting place for considering whether the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act apply to securities existing within video games,
virtual worlds, virtual reality, and augmented reality. 59
Because the Securities Act and Exchange Act do not provide a
definition for “investment contract,” the Supreme Court of the
United States in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.60 developed and adopted
the commonly used definition for this term. 61 In that case, writing
for the majority, Justice Frank Murphy stated that in determining
the existence of an investment contract, “[t]he test is whether the
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise

57. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (providing the definition of a security
under the Securities Act); see also id. § 78c(a)(10) (providing the definition of a
security under the Exchange Act).
58. See Benjamin Akins, Jennifer L. Chapman & Jason Gordon, The Case for
the U.S. Regulation of Bitcoin Mining as a Security, 19 VA. J.L. & TECH. 669, 683
(2015) (“[T]he investment contract category is essentially a ‘catch-all’ provision
whereby lots of unique instruments or interests constitute a security.”); C. Steven
Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 30 (“The most expansive part of the definition of security, the catch-all
category, is the term ‘investment contract.’”); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 16 n.49 (2016)
(“‘[I]nvestment contract’ . . . is the catch-all category for an investment that does
not otherwise fall within one of the other sub-categories listed in the term
‘security’ . . . .”).
59. See Jonathan Macey et al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets: Applying
Broker-Dealer Law to Subprime Mortgages, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 808 (2009)
(“‘Investment contract’ is the catch-all for things that walk and talk like a security
but do not fit into any of the other categories.”); Anish Vashista, David R. Johnson
& Muhtashem S. Choudhury, Securities Fraud, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 877, 899
n.142 (2005) (“‘Investment contract’ has been the catchall phrase under which
most non-traditional securities fall.”).
60. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
61. See id. at 298–99 (“[A]n investment contract for purposes of the
Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party . . . .”).
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with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” 62 This test
can be broken down into three questions. First, is there an
investment of money? Second, is there a common enterprise?
Third, is there an expectation of profits to come solely from the
efforts of others? If all three of these questions are answered
affirmatively, then an investment contract exists, and with limited
exception, federal securities regulation will apply as well. 63
The definition of an investment contract is extraordinarily
broad and can apply to a wide range of situations. For example, in
Howey, W.J. Howey Company (Howey Company) sold tracts of land
containing citrus groves to the general public. 64 At the time of sale,
Howey-in-the-Hills Service,
Inc.
(Howey-in-the-Hills),
a
corporation with the same management as Howey Company,
offered service contracts for the cultivating, harvesting, and
marketing of the groves on any land purchased. 65 The purchasers
of the land could make other arrangements to have it tended, but
85% of the land sold was serviced by Howey-in-the-Hills. 66 The
service contracts generally lasted for ten years with no option of
cancellation and granted Howey-in-the-Hills “full and complete”
possession of the land. 67 Howey-in-the-Hills pooled fruit from all of
the land that it serviced and then made an allocation of the net
profits to the land owners. 68 Despite this rather unconventional
62. Id. at 301.
63. See id. (“If [the] test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enterprise
is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of property with or
without intrinsic value. The statutory policy of affording broad protection to
investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae.” (citations
omitted)).
64. See id. at 295 (“During the past several years [Howey Company] has
planted about 500 acres annually, keeping half of the groves itself and offering
the other half to the public . . . .”).
65. See id. (“Each prospective customer is offered both a land sales contract
and a service contract, after having been told that it is not feasible to invest in a
grove unless service arrangements are made.”).
66. See id. (“Indeed, 85% of the acreage sold during the 3-year period ending
May 31, 1943, was covered by service contracts with Howey-in-the-Hills Service,
Inc.”).
67. Id. at 296.
68. See id. (“The company is accountable only for an allocation of the net
profits based upon a check made at the time of picking. All the produce is pooled
by the respondent companies, which do business under their own names.”).
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arrangement, the Supreme Court of the United States held that it
met the test for an investment contract, and as a result, it qualified
as a security under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. 69 This
test for an investment contract has been used to bring a wide
variety of investments within the ambit of the federal securities
law.70
Notably, the definition sections found in the Securities Act and
Exchange Act both begin with the prefatory language “unless the
context otherwise requires.” 71 This means that investments that
would otherwise meet the definition of a security will not be
considered a security if the context suggests that they should not
be subject to federal securities regulation. 72
69. See id. at 300 (“The investors provide the capital and share in the
earnings and profits; the promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise.
It follows that the arrangements whereby the investors’ interests are made
manifest involve investment contracts, regardless of the legal terminology in
which such contracts are clothed.”).
70. See Harvey Bines & Steve Thel, Investment Management Arrangements
and the Federal Securities Laws, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 487–88 (1997) (“Limited
partnerships, participations in oil and gas investments, pyramid schemes,
franchising arrangements, condominium sales, and a remarkable variety of other
investment arrangements have all been held to be investment contracts . . . .”);
Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising Capital Directly From Investors: What Disclosure
Does Rule 10b-5 Require?, 28 J. CORP. L. 111, 121 (2002) (“A vast variety of
business arrangements are securities by virtue of their being investment
contracts. Condominiums pooled with rental programs, cattle feeding and
marketing programs, beaver ranching schemes, and horse racing syndications are
among the diverse endeavors deemed to be ‘investment contracts’ and, therefore,
securities.”); Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws:
Opting Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
519, 537 (1999) (“Courts have used the investment contract test to reach a wide
variety of instruments, from interests in conventional investment vehicles (like
limited partnerships, franchises, and certain general partnerships) to more
unusual investment opportunities (such as schemes involving fruit trees,
chinchillas, self-improvement courses, and cemetery lots).”).
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a), 78c(a) (2012).
72. See Janet Kerr & Karen M. Eisenhauser, Reves Revisited, 19 PEPP. L.
REV. 1123, 1123–24 (1992) (explaining that “courts have universally agreed that
the introductory language ‘unless the context otherwise requires’ in both
definitions, read in light of the wide variety of transactions which are evidenced
by ‘notes,’ means that not all notes are ‘securities’ under these acts”); Dmitri A.
Pentsov, American Securities Versus Russian “Securities”: Caveat Emptor, 12
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 169 (2004) (“[T]he phrase ‘unless the context
otherwise requires’ leads to the inevitable conclusion that even those instruments
specifically included in the list of ‘securities’ would not be considered ‘securities’
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For example, in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 73 the Supreme Court
of the United States held that a certificate of deposit was not a
security under the federal securities law because the certificate of
deposit was issued by a bank and subject to another comprehensive
scheme of regulation.74 In that case, Sam and Alice Weaver
purchased a $50,000 certificate of deposit from Marine Bank. 75 The
certificate of deposit was then used to guarantee a loan by Marine
Bank to Raymond and Barbara Piccirillo. 76 The Weavers alleged
that Marine Bank had promised to allow the Piccirillos to use the
proceeds from the loan to run a business that the Piccirillos
owned. 77 Instead, Marine Bank used the proceeds from the vast
majority of the loan to pay the Piccirillos’s existing debt.78 As a
result, the business owned by the Piccirillos declared bankruptcy,
and Marine Bank decided to claim the certificate of deposit to offset
the default on the loan.79 The Weavers sued asserting that Marine
Bank had violated Section 10(b).80 The United States District
in certain instances.”); Elaine A. Welle, Limited Liability Company Interests as
Securities: An Analysis of Federal and State Actions Against Limited Liability
Companies Under the Securities Laws, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 425, 488 (1996)
(“Courts have interpreted the context clause as authorizing judicial exclusion of
certain instruments on the basis of factual circumstances, even if an instrument
falls within the statutory definition of a security.”).
73. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
74. See id. at 560 (“Accordingly, we hold that this unique agreement,
negotiated one-on-one by the parties, is not a security.”).
75. See id. at 552 (“Respondents, Sam and Alice Weaver, purchased a
$50,000 certificate of deposit from petitioner Marine Bank on February 28,
1978.”).
76. See id. at 553 (“The Weavers subsequently pledged the certificate of
deposit to Marine Bank on March 17, 1978, to guarantee a $65,000 loan . . . .”).
77. See id. (“The Weavers allege that bank officers told them [the business
the Piccirillos owned] would use the $65,000 loan as working capital . . . .”).
78. See id. (“[I]nstead [the loan] was immediately applied to pay . . . overdue
obligations [of the business that the Piccirillos owned].”).
79. See id. at 553–54 (“[The business the Piccirillos owned] became bankrupt
four months later. Although the bank had not yet resorted to the Weavers’
certificate of deposit at the time this litigation commenced, it acknowledged that
its other security was inadequate and that it intended to claim the pledged
certificate of deposit.”).
80. See id. at 554 (“These allegations were asserted in a complaint filed in
the Federal District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in support of
a claim that the bank violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
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Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted summary
judgment for Marine Bank on the ground that the alleged wrongful
conduct did not occur in relation to the purchase or sale of a
security. 81 A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court on the ground that
the certificate of deposit could potentially be considered a
security. 82
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit and held that
bank certificates of deposit do not constitute securities under
federal securities law because such instruments are covered by
another comprehensive regulatory scheme.83 In reaching this
holding, the Court noted that Congress did not intend to adopt a
remedy for all fraud in promulgating the federal securities law. 84
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger
wrote, “[d]eposits in federally regulated banks are protected by the
reserve, reporting, and inspection requirements of the federal
banking laws; advertising relating to the interest paid on deposits
is also regulated. In addition, deposits are insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.” 85 He continued, “[t]he definition
of ‘security’ in the 1934 Act provides that an instrument which
seems to fall within the broad sweep of the Act is not to be
considered a security if the context otherwise requires.” 86 As a
result of the existence of a comprehensive regulatory scheme
governing bank issued certificates of deposit, the Court held no
need existed for them to be classified as a security under federal
securities law. 87
of 1934 . . . .”).
81. See id. (“The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
bank. It concluded that if a wrong occurred it did not take place ‘in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security,’ as required for liability under § 10(b).”).
82. See id. (“The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.”).
83. See id. at 555 (“We hold that neither the certificate of deposit nor the
agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos is a security under the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.”).
84. See id. at 556 (“Moreover, we are satisfied that Congress, in enacting the
securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud.”).
85. Id. at 558.
86. Id. at 558–59.
87. See id. at 559 (“It is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of
deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
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Similarly, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 88 the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
noncontributory, compulsory pension plan should not be
considered a security for purposes of application of the federal
securities law.89 One of the rationales for reaching that holding
was that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
sufficiently regulated this type of plan.90 Writing for the majority,
Justice Lewis Powell wrote, “[t]he existence of this comprehensive
legislation governing the use and terms of employee pension plans
severely undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts
to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans.” 91 He continued,
“[n]ot only is the extension of the Securities Acts by the court below
unsupported by the language and history of those Acts, but in light
of ERISA it serves no general purpose.” 92 Both Daniel and Weaver
stand for the proposition that instruments that may look like
securities can be excluded from coverage under the federal
securities laws if the context suggests that they are covered by
some other system of regulation.
B. Registration
Should something qualify as a security under the Securities
Act and Exchange Act, it must be registered with the SEC, unless
exempted. Section 5 of the Securities Act provides: “Unless a
registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . to make use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security . . . .”93 In
since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under
the federal banking laws.”).
88. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
89. See id. at 570 (“We hold that the Securities Acts do not apply to a
noncontributory, compulsory pension plan.”).
90. See id. at 569–70 (discussing the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012).
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addition, a prospectus must be delivered to a purchaser before any
sale. 94 The registration process is both time-consuming and costly
because of the amount of information that must be disclosed. 95 In
the event registration is required, however, failing to file a
registration is grounds under Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act
for rescinding any transactions involving the unregistered
securities, even in the absence of any showing of fraud or other
wrongdoing. 96
Although registration is the default rule, certain exemptions
from registration do exist. Because of the time and cost associated
with registration, issuers often use these exemptions to avoid the
burdens of the registration process. 97 Section 3 of the Securities
94. See id. § 77e(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly . . . to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate
commerce any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after
sale, unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus . . . .”).
95. See Jeffrey E. Alberts & Bertrand Fry, Is Bitcoin a Security?, 21 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 5 (2015) (“Registration of securities under the Securities Act is
time-consuming, expensive, and typically necessitates the involvement of
attorneys, accountants, and other professionals.”); Hazen, supra note 44, at 1744
(“Registering securities under the 1933 Act is an expensive and otherwise
burdensome process that presents barriers to small businesses’ access to the U.S.
capital markets.”); Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed
at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879,
908 (2011) (providing a lengthy list of expenses associated with registering an
initial public offering with the SEC).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1) (2012)
Any person who . . . offers or sells a security in violation of
[registration requirements] . . . shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the
amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such
security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
97. See Gavin Clarkson, Wall Street Indians: Information Asymmetry and
Barriers to Tribal Capital Market Access, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 943, 957
(2008) (“Registration of securities is an expensive proposition, and the required
reporting costs the issuing entity approximately two million dollars per
year . . . . Securities that are exempt from registration avoid these costs while still
being available for purchase by both institutional investors and individual retail
investors.”); Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1457, 1474 (2013) (“[S]ecurities registration is an onerous and expensive
process, companies often prefer to raise capital in ways that will avoid the
registration requirement.”); Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities
Offerings: A Proposed Formula That Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation,
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Act exempts certain types of securities from registration
completely. 98 In addition, in promulgating the Securities Act,
Congress opted to exempt certain transactions from registration as
well; most of these exemptions appear in Section 4 of the Act.99
A complete discussion of the types of securities and
transactions exempted from the registration requirements under
Section 5 of the Securities Act is beyond the scope of this Article.
This is especially true regarding the transactions exempted from
registration under the Securities Act, due to the complexity and
narrowness of these rules. For example, Section 4(2) of the
Securities Act appears broad on its face and exempts “transactions
by an issuer not involving any public offering.” 100 However, the
Supreme Court of the United States held in SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co. 101 that, for the exemption to apply, offerees should “have access
to the kind of information which registration would disclose.” 102
Until recently, this focus on access to information, which
permeates Section 4(2) and all aspects of the Securities Act and
Exchange Act, severely limited issuers’ ability to sell securities via
the Internet through general solicitations without registering. 103
25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 199, 205–06 (1994) (“Issuers do not have to register their
securities offerings when they can satisfy all of the requirements under an
exemption, thereby avoiding the delay and expense of the registration process
that impedes their ability to raise capital.”).
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c (exempting from registration a number of types of
securities).
99. See id. § 77d (exempting from registration a number of categories of
securities transactions).
100. Id. § 77d(a)(2).
101. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
102. Id. at 127.
103. See Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP.
L. 493, 501 (2014) (“Until the JOBS Act, it was not legally possible for a new
business to sell equity or a share of its future profits over the Internet without
registering the sale under the Securities Act of 1933 (the ‘33 Act).”); Joan
MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding Era:
Disclosing to and for the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 835 (2014) (“[P]rior to the
adoption of the JOBS Act in the spring of 2012, the most promising registration
exemptions, those in Regulation D under the 1933 Act, prohibited general
solicitation and advertising, making them unavailable for open Internet
securities offerings.”); Ryan Sanchez, The New Crowdfunding Exemption: Only
Time Will Tell, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 109, 110 (2013) (“Prior to the JOBS Act,
existing securities regulations prevented the use of the Internet in marketing
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On April 5, 2012, President Barack Obama signed the JOBS Act
into law.104 The JOBS Act mandated that the SEC adopt various
rules and regulations regarding the online purchase and sale of
securities, which the Act refers to as “crowdfunding.” 105 Section
302 of the JOBS Act amended Section 4 of the Securities Act to
provide that registration is not required for the following:
(6) transactions involving the offer or sale of securities by an
issuer (including all entities controlled by or under common
control with the issuer), provided that—
(A) the aggregate amount sold to all investors by the issuer,
including any amount sold in reliance on the exemption
provided under this paragraph during the 12-month period
preceding the date of such transaction, is not more than
$1,000,000;
(B) the aggregate amount sold to any investor by an issuer,
including any amount sold in reliance on the exemption
provided under this paragraph during the 12-month period
preceding the date of such transaction, does not exceed—
(i) the greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of the annual income or
net worth of such investor, as applicable, if either the annual
income or the net worth of the investor is less than $100,000;
and
(ii) 10 percent of the annual income or net worth of such
investor, as applicable, not to exceed a maximum aggregate
securities to investors without adhering to sophistication requirements—greatly
limiting the potential pool of investors.”).
104. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
105. Id.; see also Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The SEC is Riding
Off in Two Directions at Once, 71 BUS. LAW. 781, 820 (2016) (“Crowdfunding uses
the Internet to raise capital for a wide range of projects, typically seeking small
contributions from a large number of individuals.”); Alma Pekmezovic & Gordon
Walker, The Global Significance of Crowdfunding: Solving the SME Funding
Problem and Democratizing Access to Capital, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 347,
356 (2016) (“‘[C]rowdfunding’ enables entrepreneurs who traditionally face
financing constraints to obtain capital from anyone in the world via the Internet.
Crowdfunding—as a form of crowdsourcing—is designed to facilitate raising
capital.”); Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial Innovation,
94 N.C. L. REV. 861, 875–76 (2016) (“The crowdfunding model of capital raising
relies on Internet platforms (crowdfunding sites) to raise money from the general
public, again, accumulating small contributions from many investors.”).
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amount sold of $100,000, if either the annual income or net
worth of the investor is equal to or more than $100,000;
(C) the transaction is conducted through a broker or funding
portal that complies with the requirements of section 4A(a); and
(D) the issuer complies with the requirements of section
4A(b). 106

As amended, Section 4 of the Securities Act dramatically
alters the ability of issuers to raise capital via the Internet.107 The
JOBS Act also required the SEC to amend the exemptions found
in Rule 506 and Regulation A to make the transactions in
securities via the Internet easier. 108 Issuers now have greater
access to capital, if they are willing to comply with the relevant
statutes and regulations. 109
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012).
107. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?,
100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 562 (2015) (“The JOBS Act allows general solicitation of
accredited investors, a move that makes online matchmaking and investing
legally possible in a way that it was not before.”); Seth C. Oranburg,
Bridgefunding: Crowdfunding and the Market for Entrepreneurial Finance, 25
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 400 (2015) (“In 2012, Congress amended
securities law to enable a new way to finance startups. The Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 is a law that creates a new exemption to
securities laws.”); Andrew A. Schwartz, Keep It Light, Chairman White: SEC
Rulemaking Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 45
(2013) (“Securities crowdfunding holds great promise for entrepreneurs and
public investors who will be able to connect without going through the
cumbersome and expensive initial public offering (‘IPO’) process.”).
108. See infra notes 166–74 and accompanying text (discussing the
amendments that the SEC was required to make to Rule 506 and Regulation A
under the JOBS Act).
109. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Business Lawyering in the Crowdfunding
Era, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 149, 155 (2014) (“Crowdfunding results from the
application of innovative technology to the practice of business finance and the
applicable law. . . . The Internet facilitates the efforts of businesses or their
principals in reaching out to the crowd for business capital . . . .”); Andrew A.
Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 640 (2015) (“[O]ne of
the foundational purposes of crowdfunding is to be a simple securities market
that poses extremely low costs of raising capital and is therefore accessible to a
wide swath of early-stage entrepreneurs.”); Andrew A. Schwartz, Teenage
Crowdfunding, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 515, 516 (2014) (“[I]n Title III of the JOBS Act
of 2012, known as the CROWDFUND Act, Congress created a new method of
financing startup companies . . . . [,] the sale of securities over the Internet to
large numbers of investors (the crowd), each of whom invests a small amount.”).
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C. Anti-Fraud

The Securities Act and Exchange Act also contain various
anti-fraud provisions that are designed to encourage honesty and
transparency in securities transactions. 110 For example, Section 11
of the Securities Act creates a private cause of action for
individuals who are the victim of a registration statement that
“contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading.” 111 In addition,
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act creates a private cause of
action against a person offering or selling a security “by means of
a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” 112
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder are almost certainly, however, the most important
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Section 10(b)
makes it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or
110. See SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (“A
fundamental purpose, common to . . . [the federal securities laws], was to
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and
thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”); see
also Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV.
391, 437 (2014) (“The securities laws are based on the general premise that
issuers must make full and complete disclosure of all material facts relevant to
its business.”); Anthony Michael Sabino & Michael A. Sabino, From Chiarella to
Cuban: The Continuing Evolution of the Law of Insider Trading, 16 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 673, 683 (2011) (“Viewed as one great edifice, our federal securities
laws have proven to be a durable and effective means of assuring the sanctity of
the American capital markets by imposing a discipline of transparency,
disclosure, and honesty.”); Welle, supra note 65, at 540–41 (“By prohibiting fraud
and mandating disclosure, the securities laws protect investors and promote
honesty, trust, and ethical behavior in . . . transactions. The securities laws set
standards that serve to socialize, to educate, and to direct individuals toward
more morally appropriate forms of behavior.”).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
112. Id. § 77l(a)(2).
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deceptive device or contrivance.” 113 This provision also empowers
the SEC to prescribe “such rules and regulations . . . as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.” 114 In 1942, using the power granted by Section 10(b),
the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 115

Although no private right of action is provided for in the
language of these provisions, in Kardon v. National Gypsum
Company, 116 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania became the first court to hold that a
private right of action exists under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 117
In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 118
the Supreme Court acquiesced to the existence of this implied
private right of action.119
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are important because of the
breadth of their coverage. These provisions apply to both
113. Id. § 78j(b).
114. Id.
115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
116. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
117. See id. at 514 (“[I]n view of the general purpose of the act, the mere
omission of an express provision for civil liability [in a private right of action
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] is not sufficient to negative what the general
law implies.”).
118. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
119. See id. at 13 n.9 (“It is now established that a private right of action is
implied under § 10(b).”).
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registered and unregistered securities, which means that, even if
an issuer is able to find a registration exemption, they can still be
in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 120 In addition, Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are commonly referred to as “catch-all”
provisions because they generally prohibit fraud in securities
transactions. 121 The SEC, the Department of Justice, and private
parties are all permitted to pursue violations of these provisions. 122
The private right of action under these provisions has a breadth
similar to a common law fraud claim. 123

120. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (providing that Section 10(b) applies to “any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered”).
121. As evidenced by the legislative history, Congress drafted Section 10(b) as
a “catch-all” anti-fraud provision. See Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing on
H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas G. Corcoran, Counsel,
Reconstruction Finance Corporation) (“[Section 10(b)] is a catch-all clause to
prevent manipulative and deceptive devices I do not think there is any objection
to that kind of a clause. The commission should have the authority to deal with
new manipulative devices.”). The Supreme Court has recognized in numerous
opinions that Section 10(b) is a “catch-all” antifraud provision. See, e.g., Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (“Section 10(b) is a ‘catchall’
antifraud provision . . . .”); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980)
(“Section 10(b) was designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent
practices.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976) (“This brief
explanation of [Section] 10(b) by a spokesman for its drafters is significant. The
section was described rightly as a ‘catchall’ clause to enable the Commission ‘deal
with new manipulative (or cunning) devices.’”).
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012) (granting the SEC the power to undertake
civil enforcement actions to punish violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); id.
§ 78ff (granting the DOJ the power to criminally prosecute violations of
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
123. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 157 (2008)
In a typical § 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation
or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.

SECURITIES REGULATION IN VIRTUAL SPACE

1419

IV. The Application of Federal Securities Regulation to
Virtual Space
The existing scholarship regarding the application of
securities regulation to video games, virtual worlds, virtual reality,
and augmented reality is extremely limited. 124 Most of this
scholarship only analyzes whether securities that exist entirely
within virtual space are subject to federal securities law. To fully
understand the application of federal securities regulation to
virtual space, four contexts should be considered: (1) securities
purchased and sold in real world transactions based upon real
world activity; (2) securities purchased and sold in real world
transactions based upon virtual activity; (3) securities purchased
and sold in virtual space based upon real world activity; and
(4) securities purchased and sold in virtual space based upon
activity in that space.
Regarding these four contexts, a couple of things ought to be
noted. First, as discussed below, only the last category, i.e.,
securities purchased and sold in virtual space based upon activity
in that space, is controversial. In the other contexts, federal
securities regulation almost certainly applies. Second, also
regarding the last category, the main source of controversy is
whether securities can exist within video games, virtual worlds,
virtual reality, and augmented reality. Although this Article
concludes that securities could potentially exist within virtual
space, this Article argues that securities do not exist based upon
the definition of a “security” found in Section 2(a)(1) of the
Securities Act and Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act because
the context requires that virtual realms remain beyond the reach
of federal securities regulation. 125 Each of the four contexts
mentioned above will be examined in turn.

124. See supra note 13 (discussing the limited scholarship addressing the
application of federal securities regulation to video games, virtual worlds virtual
reality, and the virtual elements of augmented reality).
125. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2012).
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A. Securities Purchased and Sold in Real World Transactions
Based Upon Real World Activity
Securities purchased and sold in real world transactions based
upon real world activity, excluding exceptional cases, are covered
by federal securities regulation. For example, securities sold by
numerous corporations, such as Apple, Chipotle, IMAX, and
Starbucks, all clearly lie within the ambit of federal securities law.
In fact, this is the exact context that Congress intended to regulate
when it promulgated the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.126
B. Securities Purchased and Sold in Real World Transactions
Based Upon Virtual Activity
Securities purchased and sold in real world transactions based
upon virtual activity are also covered by federal securities law,
except in extraordinary situations.127 Easy examples of this
include companies such as Facebook, Snap, and Twitter.128 Each of
these companies is founded upon virtual interaction among
members of these social networks, and each of these companies is
a publicly traded company under federal securities law.
126. See James D. Cox, Choice of Law Rules for International Securities
Transactions?, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1179, 1187 (1998) (“The U.S. securities laws
were enacted in the aftermath of the Great Depression and their history and
content were much influenced by our experience and faith that fair and orderly
markets are a cornerstone for not just economic stability, but social stability.”);
Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 680 (2014) (“The federal role
in securities regulation thus has its roots in the financial and macroeconomic
catastrophe of the Great Depression. The President and Congress intended to
insure disclosure to investors.” (footnotes omitted)).
127. See infra Part IV.D (explaining that only virtual securities sold in virtual
space are controversial because of their lack of anchor in the real world).
128. See Will Snap Be the Next Facebook—or Twitter?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
(Feb.
9, 2017), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/will-snap-nextfacebook-twitter/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“Since Snap filed its S-1 publicly
with the SEC last week, there has also been a lot written already comparing the
attributes of Snap, as it gets ready for its IPO, to those of Facebook and Twitter—
both leading social media companies when they went public.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Moreover, publicly traded companies commonly create their
business models upon activities occurring in virtual space.
Activision Blizzard, Inc. is the parent company of Blizzard
Entertainment, which is the maker of the video game World of
Warcraft, 129 and it is a good example of a company that bases a
substantial portion of its profits on users interacting within a
virtual space. The company’s profitably is heavily dependent on
online users continuing to use the virtual world created by this
video game maker.130 Put simply, just because a company founds
its business model on behavior that occurs within virtual space
does not mean that it is excluded from the ambit of federal
securities regulation.
C. Securities Purchased and Sold in Virtual Transactions Based
Upon Real World Activity
Securities purchased and sold in virtual transactions based
upon real world activities are also covered by the federal securities
law, except in extraordinary situations. 131 For example, just
because an individual begins soliciting friends and family
members via LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, or a variety
of other social networks to become passive investors in a new
venture—i.e., to purchase investment contracts, which are a form
of security—does not mean that individual has avoided the
application of the federal securities law. The same would be true if
real world companies began to offer their shares and to engage in
securities transactions within virtual space. In fact, because of the
ubiquity of the Internet and email in securities transactions, the
application of federal securities regulation in this context, except
in certain extraordinary situations, is almost beyond question. 132
Even if virtual space is used to conduct transactions in real
129. See ACTIVISION BLIZZARD, http://www.activisionblizzard.com/about-us
(last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (discussing Activision Blizzard’s corporate structure)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
130. Id.
131. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing how securities
regulation has adapted to cover online transactions).
132. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing that the Internet is
an omnipresent tool in the purchasing and selling of securities).
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securities, the federal securities law almost certainly applies
because it is being used as a means of communication similar to
email or the Internet.
D. Securities Purchased and Sold in Virtual Transactions Based
Upon Virtual Activity
Of the four contexts discussed in this Article, the most
controversial is securities purchased and sold in virtual
transactions based upon virtual activity. Unlike the three previous
contexts discussed above, these securities have no anchor in the
real world because they exist completely within virtual space.
Terming these virtual things “securities” is in itself controversial
because concluding that they are securities within the definitions
found in Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Section 3(a)(10)
of the Exchange Act means that the federal securities law
applies. 133
This Article loosely employs the term “securities” for two
reasons. First, using the term loosely provides a much easier
shorthand for the Article’s subject matter. For example, referring
to the subject matter within this Article as “online elements of
video games, virtual worlds, virtual reality experiences, and
augmented reality experiences that may or may not be securities
for purposes of federal securities law” would considerably lower the
reader’s enjoyment. Second, securities purchased and sold in
virtual transactions based upon virtual activity technically fall
under the definitions found within Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities
Act and Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act, but as will be
explained, because of their virtual context, should be excluded. The
law is unsettled, however, and these virtual items might very well
be considered securities under federal law. Thus, for the sake of
ease, this Article will refer to these virtual items as securities.
Notably, in July 2017, the SEC did take a step toward
addressing the topic presented in this Article when it issued a
report stating that certain cryptocurrencies could be subject to
federal securities regulation, if they met the definition of a
133.

15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2012).
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security. 134 In the report, the SEC stated that the cryptocurrency
in the matter was offered and sold by a “virtual organization”
known as “The DAO.” 135 Assuming that the judiciary agrees with
the SEC’s assessment, which it may not, when the issue ultimately
is litigated in some case, this offers a partial answer to when
securities purchased and sold in virtual transactions based upon
virtual activity are subject to federal securities regulation. With
that said, the SEC report in no way resolves the issue presented in
this paper because it did not involve securities existing within
virtual space, i.e., video games, virtual worlds, virtual reality, and
augmented reality. In addition, the report does not have the
precedential value of a decision by any federal court.
If the securities existing entirely within virtual space are
securities under federal law, the most likely rationale would be
their classification as investment contracts. As previously
explained, the definitions of a security found within Section 2(a)(1)
of the Securities Act and Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act
include some types of investments with narrow, well-settled
definitions and some types of investments with broad, more
flexible definitions. 136 For purposes of analyzing whether
securities existing entirely within virtual space are securities
under federal securities law, this Article focuses on the term
“investment contract.” This is useful because the term is found
both in Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Section 3(a)(10) of
the Exchange Act, and it covers a wide variety of circumstances
involving non-traditional securities, i.e., it is a catch-all. 137 As
provided in Howey, “[t]he test is whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others.” 138 Satisfying the test requires
affirmatively answering three questions. First, is there an
134. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017).
135. Id. at 1.
136. See supra Part III.A (discussing the definition of a security under the
Securities Act and Exchange Act).
137. See supra notes 49–65 and accompanying text (explaining the breadth of
the term “investment contract” under federal securities law).
138. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
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investment of money?139 Second, is there a common enterprise? 140
Third, is there an expectation of profits to come solely from the
efforts of others? 141 Unless the virtual context requires a different
result, the applicability of the Howey test to virtual space in some
instances is almost certain. 142
For example, a video game or augmented reality game
developer could create a game in which an individual uses real
world currency to purchase virtual currency that would then be
used to purchase passive investments in a virtual business with
the expectation that the management of the virtual business
generate a virtual profit that the investor could eventually convert
back into real world currency. In this situation, federal securities
law likely applies, unless the context otherwise requires. The facts
that the transaction is completed via avatar and that the profits
are eventually converted into real world currency are irrelevant for
purposes of the Howey test—unless the context calls for what
would otherwise be treated as a securities transaction to be treated
differently.
Notably, Second Life, an online virtual world, created and
owned by Linden Lab, which was popular during the 2000s, allows
such virtual securities transactions to occur. 143 Throughout its
existence, Second Life has had securities exchanges operating that
are potentially governed by state and federal securities
regulation. 144 Despite Second Life’s waning popularity, similar
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017)
(providing the official webpage for Second Life) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
144. See Neil A. Beekman, Virtual Assets, Real Tax: The Capital
Gains/Ordinary Income Distinction in Virtual Worlds, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 152, 159 (2010) (“Some virtual worlds provide users with opportunities to
invest their virtual world money . . . . Second Life has user-created virtual stock
exchanges in which users buy and sell shares of Second Life companies.”); Robert
J. Bloomfield & Young Jun Cho, Unregulated Stock Markets in Second Life, 78
SOUTHERN ECON. J. 6, 7 (2011) (“This article examines data on issue activity and
investor returns in the Second Life Capital Exchange (SLCapex), an exchange
created and operated by residents of the virtual world Second Life.”); Thompson,
supra note 13, at 94–95 (“Some Second Life entrepreneurs have taken virtual
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elements that satisfy the Howey test could easily be incorporated
into other video games, virtual reality experiences, and augmented
reality experiences. This could potentially create unintended
liability for developers, platform owners, and users of this virtual
space.
The case law on the application of federal securities regulation
to securities existing solely in virtual space is sparse. The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is the sole federal
circuit court that has addressed the issue. In SEC v. SG Ltd., 145
the court held that securities purchased and sold in virtual
transactions based upon virtual activity are governed by federal
securities law.146 In that case, the SEC brought a civil action
against SG Ltd., a Dominican company, for operating an online
investment game, called “StockGeneration,” which offered players
the ability to purchase shares in eleven different “virtual
companies” that were listed on a “virtual stock exchange.” 147 The
SEC was concerned about representations regarding a virtual
enterprise, known as the “privileged company,” that SG promised
would increase in value based on the inflow of capital from new
participants, which would create liquidity for players’ shares. 148
SG claimed it had various measures in place to keep the price of
the shares of the privileged company from declining rapidly in the
event that the share prices did begin to decline. 149 At least 800
consumption so far as to build stock exchanges, which often imitate many of the
characteristics of a real world stock exchange.”).
145. 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2001).
146. See id. at 55 (“[W]e hold that the SEC has alleged a set of facts which, if
proven, satisfy the three-part Howey test and . . . constituted an invitation to enter
into an investment contract within the jurisdictional reach of the federal
securities laws.”).
147. See id. at 44 (“The underlying litigation was spawned by SG’s operation
of a ‘StockGeneration’ website offering on-line denizens an opportunity to
purchase shares in eleven different ‘virtual companies’ listed on the website’s
‘virtual stock exchange.’”).
148. See id. (“According to SG’s representations, capital inflow from new
participants provided ‘liquidity’ for existing participants who might choose to sell
their virtual shareholdings.”).
149. See id. at 44–45 (“While SG conceded that a decline in the share price
was theoretically possible, it assured prospective participants that ‘under the
rules governing the fall in prices, [the share price for the privileged company]
cannot fall by more than 5% in a round.’”).
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United States residents purchased shares of the virtual companies
using real money, and investments in the StockGeneration game
totaled millions of real dollars. 150 The value of the shares of all of
the virtual companies listed on the virtual stock exchange in
StockGeneration eventually plummeted, including the shares of
the privileged company.151 The SEC brought a civil action for
injunctive relief and disgorgement under Section 5 of the
Securities Act for the offer, sale, and delivery of unregistered
securities; Section 17(a) of the Securities Act for fraud in the offer
and sale of securities; and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereupon, for fraud in connection with
the purchase and sale of securities. 152 The United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts granted SG’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim on the ground that the virtual
shares were not securities because StockGeneration was a game
that lacked a business context.153
The First Circuit reversed and held that federal securities law
can apply to virtual securities purchased and sold in virtual
transactions based upon virtual activity, even within the context
of a video game.154 The First Circuit determined that the Howey
test was the most appropriate to determine whether federal
securities law applies within virtual space. 155 Writing for the three
150. See id. at 45 (“At least 800 United States domiciliaries, paying real cash,
purchased virtual shares in the virtual companies listed on the defendants’
virtual stock exchange.”).
151. See id. (discussing the eventual dramatic decline of the value of the
virtual securities within the StockGeneration game).
152. See id. (“The SEC’s complaint alleged, in substance, that SG’s operations
constituted a fraudulent scheme in violation of the registration and antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.”).
153. See id. at 46 (“The SEC’s success was short-lived; after some skirmishing,
not relevant here, the district court granted SG’s motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a cognizable claim on the ground that the virtual shares were
a clearly marked and defined game lacking a business context.”).
154. See id. at 48 (“[T]he language on SG’s website emphasizing the gamelike nature of buying and selling virtual shares of the privileged company does
not place such transactions beyond the long reach of the federal securities laws.”).
155. See id. (“To sum up, Howey supplies the appropriate template for
identifying investment contracts within the overarching ambit of the federal
securities laws. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, this template admits
of no exception for games or gaming.”).
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judge panel, Chief Judge Michael Boudin stated, “Howey supplies
the appropriate template for identifying investment contracts
within the overarching ambit of the federal securities laws.
Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, this template admits of
no exception for games or gaming.”156 He continued: “[T]he
language on SG’s website emphasizing the game-like nature of
buying and selling virtual shares of the privileged company does
not place such transactions beyond the long reach of the federal
securities laws.” 157 Thus, the First Circuit held that because all of
the elements of the Howey test could potentially have been proven,
the case was improperly dismissed. As a result, the First Circuit
reversed the district court, which allowed the matter to proceed. 158
If securities existing entirely within virtual space are
securities under federal regulation, that entire body of law would
apply, including both the registration and anti-fraud provisions
discussed above.159 The simplest and probably most effective
means of preventing securities existing entirely in virtual space
from being covered by federal securities law is to eliminate any sort
of monetary investment within the game. Under the Howey test,
the investment of money is an essential element of an “investment
contract.” 160 Because virtual space can be an extension of the real
world, however, software developers may wish to allow real world
currency to be exchanged for virtual currency. 161 In those
circumstances, software developers must be especially wary of
creating investment contracts and subjecting themselves, platform
owners, and users to federal securities law.

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 55 (“Accordingly, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”).
159. See supra Part III (providing a brief introduction to the registration
requirements and antifraud provisions under federal securities law).
160. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (providing that the
test for an investment contract is “whether the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others”).
161. See supra Part II.A (offering a brief primer on video games, virtual
worlds, virtual reality, and augmented reality).

1428

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1387 (2017)

Any attempt to limit the application of federal securities law
to virtual space through end-user license agreements or any other
sort of agreement will prove ineffective. Section 14 of the Securities
Act provides: “Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any
person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any
provision of this title or of the rules and regulations of the
Commission shall be void.”162 Moreover, Section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act provides: “Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this
title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a
self-regulatory organization, shall be void.” 163 As a result, the
application of the federal securities law cannot be waived or
contracted around. 164
In addition, despite having a major impact on how securities
offerings and transactions can occur online, the provisions of the
JOBS Act are likely to be relatively useless to software developers,
platform owners, and users in shielding them from the application
of federal securities law because of how onerous it would be to
comply with the mandates of the JOBS Act.165 The JOBS Act
amended various portions of the Securities Act to allow for
expanded offerings, purchases, and sales via the Internet and
mandated that the SEC adopt various rules and regulations
regarding the online purchase and sale of securities. 166
162. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012).
163. Id. § 78cc(a).
164. Id. §§ 77n, 78cc(a).
165. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
166. Id.; see Nicholas Herdrich, Just Say No to Crowdfunding, 6 U. PUERTO
RICO BUS. L.J. 157, 158 (2015)
In an effort to address this problem and fuel economic growth in the
United States with increased access to capital, the federal government
passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act . . . in 2012, which
gave early-stage businesses the ability to participate in crowdfunding
and raise capital by selling securities over the Internet.
Sean M. O’Connor, Crowdfunding’s Impact on Start-Up IP Strategy, 21 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 895, 895 (2014) (“JOBS Act provides a mechanism for ordinary
investors and start-ups to use ‘enterprise crowdfunding,’ in which the start-ups
can offer and sell their stock widely through the Internet.”); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Uber TV: Internet Only TV Stations, 23 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 65, 89 (2016) (“The
Congress, in the JOBS Act . . . now permit small enterprises to raise investment
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Specifically, Title III of the JOBS Act—known as the Capital
Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical
Non-Disclosure Act of 2012 (CROWDFUND Act)—added Section
4(a)(6) to the Securities Act, which creates an exemption from
registration for certain limited online offerings facilitated by
brokers or a new type of entity called a “funding portals.” 167 In
addition, the CROWDFUND Act created Section 4A of the
Securities Act, which places substantial requirements upon the
intermediaries—i.e., brokers and funding portals—facilitating
transactions and issuers undertaking transactions under the
Section 4(a)(6) exemption.168 Section 4A also places substantial
restrictions on the resale of securities purchased under the Section
4(a)(6) exemption.169 Based on the congressional mandate found in
the JOBS Act, the SEC has promulgated Regulation Crowdfunding
(Regulation CF), which places even more requirements to comply
with the crowdfunding exemption. 170
Also, the JOBS Act altered two existing exemptions in ways
that might have an impact upon the lawfulness of securities
transactions within virtual space. Section 201(a)(1) of the JOBS
Act required the SEC to amend Rule 506.171 The amendment
allows for general solicitation and advertising of securities
capital through Internet-based crowdsourcing.”).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012).
168. Id. § 77d-1(b) (2012) (providing a lengthy list of requirements for issuers
offering or selling securities under the section 4(a)(6) exemption); Id. § 77d-1(a)
(2017) (providing a lengthy list of requirements for intermediaries involved in the
offer or sale of securities under the section 4(a)(6) exemption).
169. Id. § 77d-1(e). Section 4A provides that securities sold under the Section
4(a)(6) exemption can only be transferred within one year of the purchase, if they
are transferred “(A) to the issuer of the securities; (B) to an accredited investor;
(C) as part of an offering registered with the Commission; or (D) to a member of
the family of the purchaser or the equivalent, or in connection with the death or
divorce of the purchaser or other similar circumstance, in the discretion of the
Commission.” Id. § 77d-1(e)(1). These limitations on resale can be supplemented
because transfer of securities under Section 4(a)(6) “shall [also] be subject to such
other limitations as the Commission shall, by rule, establish.” Id. § 77d-1(e)(2).
170. See 17 C.F.R. § 227 (2017) (adding various financial qualifications to
invoke the exemption).
171.
See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126
Stat. 306, 313 (2012) (“[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission shall revise its
rules issued in section 230.506 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations . . . .”).
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otherwise covered by the Rule’s exemption, as long as the
purchasers of the of the securities are accredited investors within
the definition found within Rule 501.172 For individuals, Rule 501
limits “accredited investor” status to people with a high net worth,
with a substantial income, or with certain types of governance
statuses within the issuer, including directors, executive officers,
and general partners.173 Substantial restrictions are also placed on
the resale of securities purchased under the Rule 506 exemption. 174
Finally, Section 401 of the JOBS Act amended the Securities
Act and required the SEC to amend Regulation A to what has
become known as Regulation A+.175 Regulation A+ allows issuers
172. Id.; see also Harvey Bines & Steve Thel, The Varieties of Investment
Management Law, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 71, 161 (2016) (“In July 2013,
the SEC amended Rule 506 . . . . General solicitation is [now] not prohibited in a
Rule 506 offering so long as all purchasers are accredited investors and the issuer
takes reasonable steps to assure that all purchasers are accredited investors.”);
Wulf Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank-Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry:
Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2015, 71 BUS. LAW. 1151, 1166 n.100 (2016)
(“Section 201 of the JOBS Act directed the SEC to lift the prohibition against
general solicitation and general advertising, allowing a broadening of marketing
efforts provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.”);
Neal Newman, Let Sleeping Regs Lie: A Diatribe on Regulation A’s Futility Before
and After the J.O.B.S. Act, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 65, 84 (2015) (“Title II of the
J.O.B.S. Act changed the solicitation rules. Now, under added Regulation D Rule
506(c), issuers can solicit and advertise for investors with the caveat that actual
investors must be accredited.”).
173. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2017) (providing the definition of an
“accredited investor” as used within Rule 506).
174. See id. § 230.502(d) (providing the limitations on resale of securities sold
under the exemption found within Rule 506).
175. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, § 401, 126
Stat. 306, 323–25 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2012)); see
also Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The SEC’s Regulation A+: Small Business Goes
Under the Bus Again, 104 KY. L.J. 325, 325–26 (2016) (“Title IV of the JOBS Act,
which is entitled ‘Small Company Capital Formation,’ requires the Securities and
Exchange Commission to adopt new rules regarding offerings under Regulation
A . . . . The new regime is generally referred to as Regulation A+.”); Michael K.
Molitor, Business Associations, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 837, 840 n.21 (2015) (“Title IV
of the JOBS Act amended section 3(b) of the Securities Act to direct the SEC to
adopt an exemption allowing public offerings of up to $50 million (subject to
periodic increases to be determined by the SEC) of equity or debt securities in a
12-month period.”); John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Act’s Strange Bedfellows:
Democracy and Start-Up Company Investing, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 357, 372 n.81
(2013) (“[T]he JOBS Act directs the SEC to create a new regulation for offerings
up to $50 million—informally known as Regulation A+ because Regulation A
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to engage in certain limited offerings with more limited disclosure
requirements than what would otherwise be required by
registering the securities. 176 Under the exemption, an issuer who
raises up to $20 million in any twelve-month period must provide
investors with an offering circular, and an issuer who raises
between $20 million and $50 million in any twelve-month period
must provide investors with an offering circular and make certain
periodic disclosures to the SEC.177 Notably, those entities
employing Regulation A+ can engage in general solicitation and
advertising. 178 Additionally, securities sold under Regulation A+
are not restricted and can be immediately resold. 179
Notwithstanding the expanded exemptions from registration
created by the JOBS Act, the Act offers little relief for software
developers, platform owners, and users involved in securities
transactions based upon virtual activity in virtual space. First,
through the JOBS Act, Congress enacted an exemption from
registration only for certain sorts of online securities transactions,
not a general exemption from federal securities regulation for
securities existing entirely in virtual space.180 Even if these
offerings are capped at $5 million—and grants the SEC discretion to require
issuers that rely on Regulation A+ to file periodic disclosures.”).
176. See Merritt B. Fox, Regulating Public Offerings of Truly New Securities:
First Principles, 66 DUKE L.J. 673, 723 (2016) (“Regulation A+ in many ways
resembles the traditional registration process but is simpler and less burdensome
on issuers.”); Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial
Innovation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 861, 877 (2016) (“Now, pursuant to Regulation A+,
small companies can offer and sell up to $50 million (an increase from the
previous $5 million limit) in equity securities without the need to comply with
traditional registration and reporting requirements.”).
177. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2017).
178. See Dale A. Oesterle, Intermediaries in Internet Offerings: The Future is
Here, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 544 (2015) (“Regulation A, in essence a form
of public offering with lighter registration and offering rules (often described as a
‘mini-public offering’), has always had the advantage . . . of allowing general
solicitation and advertising . . . .”).
179. See id. (noting that one of the advantages of the Regulation A+ exemption
is “avoiding resale restrictions on the securities issued in the offering”).
180. See Carlos Berdejó, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,
26 n.137 (2015) (“It is worth noting that while the JOBS Act eases the limitation
on offers imposed by the Securities Act, it does not exempt such offers from
potential anti-fraud liability under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act or Section
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.”).
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securities could be shoehorned into the exemptions created by the
JOBS Act, software developers, platform owners, and users would
still be subject to the other provisions of federal securities law,
including the anti-fraud provisions. 181
Second, the exemption created by the CROWDFUND Act is so
onerous to comply with that no software developer, platform
owner, or user is likely going to take the time and expense to
comply with it, especially considering the required disclosures and
prohibitions on resale. 182 Similarly, even with the modifications to
Rule 506 and Regulation A, complying with those exemptions is
likely to be beyond the abilities and interest of those who might be
contemplating dealing with securities existing entirely within
virtual space. 183 Although this might be somewhat palatable
because it could limit fraud in virtual space by dissuading
developers from creating anything that appears to be similar to a
security, limiting the development and growth of these virtual
spaces is likely undesirable because it would hinder these virtual
realms from evolving and growing.
Third, the JOBS Act is unlikely to be very helpful to software
developers, platform owners, and users because they are unlikely
to be well versed in securities regulation. Although larger game
developers are likely to have legal counsel, many software
developers, platform owners, and users will not. Even if securities
181. See Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising Capital From Investors, 28 J. CORP.
L. 111, 112 (2002) (“Even though an offering of securities is exempt from
registration, it is not exempt from the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws, principally Rule 10b-5 under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.”); Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street
2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 214 n.200 (2012) (“Compliance with a registration
exemption does not preclude liability under anti-fraud provisions of the securities
laws, such as Rule 10b-5 governing omissions or misstatements.”); Marc I.
Steinberg & Emmanuel U. Obi, Examining the Pipeline: A Contemporary
Assessment of Private Investments in Public Equity (‘PIPEs’), 11 U. PA. J. BUS. &
EMP. L. 1, 12 (2008) (“[I]rrespective of the availability of an exemption from
registration, the antifraud provisions of both federal and state securities laws
apply.”).
182. See supra notes 161–165 and accompanying text (discussing the
exemption created by the CROWDFUND Act).
183. See supra notes 166–170 and accompanying text (discussing the
modifications made by the JOBS Act to the exemptions under Rule 506 and
Regulation A).
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existing entirely in virtual space could be shoehorned into the
exemptions created by the JOBS Act, considering how regularly
individuals, including lawyers, blunder into trouble with securities
law, most software developers, platform owners, or users will be
unlikely to make use of these exemptions based upon either not
knowing they exist or not understanding how to make use of
them.184
As a result, in the absence of congressional action, the only
way that securities existing entirely in virtual space are going to
escape being subject to federal securities regulation is if the
definition of a security found within the Securities Act and
Exchange Act allows those securities to escape the purview of
federal securities law. As explained above, the definition sections
found in the Securities Act and Exchange Act both begin with the
prefatory language “unless the context otherwise requires.” 185
Thus, the question becomes whether the virtual context of these
securities should be grounds for precluding the application of
federal securities law.
V. The Arguments for Not Applying Federal Securities Regulation
to Securities Existing Entirely Within Virtual Space
Even though the prefatory language of the definition sections
of both the Securities Act and Exchange Act contain the phrase
“unless the context otherwise requires,” this phrase is not defined
anywhere within those acts or by SEC rules and regulations. 186 As
a result, the phrase’s exact meaning has been left to judicial
development. As discussed above, the Supreme Court of the United
States examined this language in cases such as Daniel and Marine
Bank. 187 The Court’s unwillingness to find the existence of
184. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (reporting that even attorneys
often have difficulty dealing with federal securities law because of its complexity).
185. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a), 78c(a) (2012); see also supra notes 66–87 and
accompanying text (discussing the significance of the “unless the context
otherwise requires” language found within the definition of a security in the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act).
186. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a), 78c(a).
187. See supra notes 68–87 and accompanying text (discussing Marine Bank
and Daniel).
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securities in either of those opinions based upon the “unless the
context otherwise requires” language turned largely on the
existence of another comprehensive scheme of federal
regulation. 188 But the Court has never opined whether the
existence of another comprehensive scheme of federal regulation is
the only context in which things that otherwise would be securities
would be held not to be.
Thus, one starts with a relatively blank slate in determining
whether the “unless the context otherwise requires” language
excludes securities entirely within virtual space from coverage by
federal securities law. Of course, as previously mentioned, a
federal court of appeals opinion has addressed whether securities
contained within virtual worlds should be considered securities
under the federal securities law. 189 In SEC v. SG Ltd., the First
Circuit did not directly address the “unless the context otherwise
requires” language. However, the court held irrelevant, for
purposes of determining whether a security existed under federal
securities law, the fact that the investments at issue existed in a
game-like environment.190 This supports the argument that the
“unless the context otherwise requires” language is not grounds to
exclude securities existing entirely within virtual space from the
definition of a security and the coverage of the federal securities
law. For the reasons discussed in the remainder of this Part, this
Article takes the position that SG Ltd. was wrongly decided.
Courts deciding this issue in the future should reach the opposite
holding from that court regarding whether securities existing
entirely within virtual space are covered by federal securities
regulation.
In addressing whether the “unless the context otherwise
requires” language applies to securities existing entirely within
188. See supra notes 68–87 and accompanying text (discussing Marine Bank
and Daniel).
189. See SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 55 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he opportunity
to invest in the shares of the privileged company, described on SG’s website,
constituted an invitation to enter into an investment contract within the
jurisdictional reach of the federal securities laws.”).
190. See id. at 48 (“[T]he language on SG’s website emphasizing the game-like
nature of buying and selling virtual shares of the privileged company does not
place such transactions beyond the long reach of the federal securities laws.”).
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virtual space, the proper place to begin is with the language of the
phrase itself. The central word of this phrase is the term “context.”
A basic definition of the term “context” is “the interrelated
conditions in which something exists or occurs.” 191 As a
consequence, the “unless the context otherwise requires” language
means that if the surrounding conditions of the thing that might
be a security dictate that it not be covered by the federal securities
law, then it should not be covered. The issue becomes whether
securities existing entirely within virtual space exist in proper
conditions to be considered securities. Based upon the intended
scope of the federal securities law, various constitutional law
principles, and the importance of allowing experimentation within
virtual space, this Article argues that securities existing entirely
in virtual space are not securities for purposes of federal securities
law.
A. The Intended Scope of Federal Securities Law
Securities existing entirely within virtual space are outside
the intended scope of federal securities regulation. Because the
context language in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
provides insufficient guidance regarding its meaning, one should
attempt to derive the intended coverage of that language by
looking at the Acts themselves. Congress promulgated the
Securities Act to regulate the primary markets for securities, with
a focus on public offerings, registration requirements, exemptions
of registration, and issues of fraud that might occur within those
primary markets. 192 Congress promulgated the Exchange Act to
191. Context, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/context (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
192. See Cory Alpert, Financial Services in the United States and United
Kingdom, 5 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 75, 76 (2008) (“The Securities Act
regulates the primary market—direct sales from issuers—and requires issuers to
register every offer or sale of a security in the United States, except for certain
exempted transactions.”); Browning Jeffries, The Implications of Janus on Issuer
Liability in Jurisdictions Rejecting Collective Scienter, 43 SETON HALL L. REV.
491, 498 (2013) (“[T]he Securities Act can be thought of as regulating the
disclosures provided to investors in the initial distribution of securities—i.e.,
through the primary market . . . .”); Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social
Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 97 (2014)
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regulate the secondary markets for securities, with a focus on
prevention of fraud within the secondary markets, periodic
disclosure for public companies, shareholder voting, and various
other issues. 193 As previously discussed, these Acts have been
found to be applicable to securities transactions involving
cyberspace. 194 But the Acts appear to be focused on securities
transactions that have a substantial link to the real world. To put
it a bit differently, when the Internet is used as a means of
communication, i.e, similar to a telephone, television, or radio, the
Acts apply. However, applying the Acts to securities solely within
virtual space is beyond the regulatory scheme of federal securities
law, which focuses on the regulation of investments in real world
businesses.
Even if the language and structure of the provisions of the
Securities Act and Exchange Act do not provide clear guidance as
to the intended scope of the Securities Act and Exchange Act, the
legislative history of those Acts provides additional support that
these bodies of law were not intended to cover securities existing
entirely within virtual space. In attempting to determine the
meaning of the “unless the context otherwise requires” 195 language
(“The Securities Act governs the disclosure requirements related to the issuance
of securities in primary markets, primarily by requiring firms that wish to sell
securities in the U.S. market to register with the SEC through the submission of
a publicly available registration statement.”).
193. See Susan B. Heyman, Rethinking Regulation Fair Disclosure and
Corporate Free Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1099, 1111 (2015) (“The Exchange Act
was enacted after the 1929 stock market crash to restore confidence in the
nation’s securities market by governing securities transactions on secondary
markets.”); Kristin Johnson, Steven A. Ramirez & Cary Martin Shelby,
Diversifying to Mitigate Risk: Can Dodd–Frank Section 342 Help Stabilize the
Financial Sector?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795, 1824 (2016) (“[T]he Exchange
Act regulates the disclosure of information related to securities traded on the
secondary markets. Broadly prohibiting fraud in connection with the sale of
securities is . . . an integral component of this legislation.”); Tom C.W. Lin, A
Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 325, 329 (2011)
(“The Exchange Act . . . governs the subsequent trading of those securities in
secondary markets. Like the Securities Act, the Exchange Act attempts to ensure
that investors in those secondary markets receive accurate and meaningful
information about the offered securities and their issuing firms.”).
194. See supra Part IV (discussing the application of federal securities
regulation to cyberspace).
195. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a), 78c(a) (2012).
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found in the definition sections of the Securities Act and Exchange
Act, one should attempt to understand the intent of Congress when
it promulgated these bodies of law. The Securities Act and
Exchange Act were passed in the shadow of the stock market crash
of 1929 and during the ensuing Great Depression, which suggests
that the drafters of these Acts were concerned about real world
securities markets, rather than what might be going on within any
sort of fantasy play.196
The drafters of the Exchange Act explicitly included the
“Necessity for Regulation” in Section 2 of the Act. 197 Section 2, in
part, provides:
[T]ransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are effected
with a national public interest which makes it necessary to
provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of
practices and matters related thereto, including transactions by
officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require
appropriate reports, to remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanisms of a national market system for securities and a
national system for the clearance and settlement of securities
transactions and the safeguarding of securities and funds
related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to make
such regulation and control reasonably complete and effective,
in order to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the
Federal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the

196. See Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Corporations and the 99%: Team Production
Revisited, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 163, 203 (2016) (“The federal securities
laws enacted in the 1930s were a response to the 1929 stock market crash and
the Great Depression.”); Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5: The Continued Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the
Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 851 (2009) (“Federal
securities regulation began in the United States when Congress passed the
Securities Act of 1933 . . . and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . . Congress
enacted these statutes in response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the
Great Depression.”); Jill Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as
an Investor Protection Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 180 (“After the stock
market crash of 1929 led to the Great Depression, a concerned Congress enacted
the federal securities laws to restore investor confidence in and facilitate the
healthy functioning of capital markets.”).
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
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national banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets . . . . 198

The drafters of Section 2 also noted that that Congress was
especially concerned by:
National
emergencies,
which
produce
widespread
unemployment and the dislocation of trade, transportation, and
industry, and which burden interstate commerce and adversely
affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and
prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable
fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation on
such exchanges and markets, and to meet such emergencies the
Federal Government is put to such great expense as to burden
the national credit. 199

As evidenced by Section 2, Congress was interested in
preventing another stock market crash similar to the stock market
crash that occurred in 1929, when it enacted the Exchange Act. 200
In short, Congress wanted to protect the securities markets that
impact the national economy.201 While a similar provision does not
exist within the Securities Act of 1933, one can extrapolate that
Congress was similarly motivated in promulgating that Act.
In addition, Supreme Court precedent, at least implicitly,
supports that securities existing entirely within virtual space
reside in a context separate and apart from the intended context of
federal securities law. As the Supreme Court held in SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 202 the “fundamental
purpose” underlying both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
is to “substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy
of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry.” 203 The focus of this often-quoted
language is on “business,” rather than fantasy play within virtual
space.
Based upon the regulatory scheme of the Securities Act and
Exchange Act, the provisions within those bodies of law, the
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 197–199 and accompanying text (stating the rationale
provided by Congress in Section 2 of the Exchange Act).
201. Id.
202. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
203. Id. at 186.
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historical context in which those Acts were promulgated, and the
intent of Congress in promulgating the federal securities law, it is
difficult to believe that Congress had any intention to extend
federal securities regulation into the fantasy play of virtual space.
Although the Securities Act and Exchange Act extend broadly,
especially based on the expansive definition of an “investment
contract,” extending their reach to cover the fantasy play within
virtual space is not appropriate. 204 Although some legal relief
obviously should be granted if real world money or other real world
value is stolen in these virtual securities transactions, federal
securities law is not the correct body of law to employ when
securities existing entirely in virtual space are involved.
B. Constitutional Law and the Limits of Federal Securities
Regulation
As the previous subpart demonstrates, a divide exists between
the contexts of the real-world business transactions that the
Securities Act and Exchange Act were intended to regulate and the
fantasy play in securities found within virtual space. Even though
securities existing entirely within virtual space may meet the test
for an investment contract under the definition of a security, the
virtual context makes the existence of a security for purposes of
the Securities Act and Exchange Act a much closer call. 205 In
addition to the intended scope of federal securities law,
constitutional law also requires that securities existing entirely
within virtual space should not be covered by federal securities law
because of federalism, rule of lenity, and separation of powers
concerns.
The United States Constitution created a limited federal
government.206 The Tenth Amendment makes clear that “[t]he
204. See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text (discussing the broad
definition of a security under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act).
205. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the reasons why securities in virtual
space may satisfy the definition of an investment contract under the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act).
206. See Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 987, 995–96 (2011)

1440

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1387 (2017)

powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”207 Congress clearly has the power to
regulate the vast majority of virtual space because the
Constitution affords Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce, 208 and the Internet is a channel and instrumentality of
interstate commerce. 209 However, when doubt exists as to whether
Congress has exercised its power, the executive branch should err
in enforcing the law and the judicial branch should err in
interpreting the law in ways that reserve regulatory power to the
states.
Because substantial reasons exist to question whether
securities existing entirely in virtual space are covered by federal
securities law, the definition of a security under the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act should be interpreted to exclude these
securities from coverage to preserve power to the states as
guaranteed by the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment. Other
Congress can use only reasonable means to effectuate its granted
powers, and cannot unreasonably affect those primary decisions
concerning human conduct that the Constitution did not subject to
federal legislation and so reserved to the states. It is implicit in the
very structure of the Constitution establishing a limited federal
government.
Christo Lassiter, The New Race Cases and the Politics of Public Policy, 12 J.L. &
POL. 411, 445 (1996) (“The drafters framed a constitution which positioned a
limited federal government to address . . . public problems of a new republic, and,
being fearful of tyranny, they restrained the federal government from doing
more.”).
207. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
208. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes”).
209. See Michele Martinez Campbell, The Kids Are Online: The Internet, the
Commerce Clause, and the Amended Federal Kidnapping Act, 14 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 215, 243 (2011) (“There can be no dispute that the Internet is a facility or
instrumentality of interstate commerce as that term is used in the Court’s modern
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”); Lauren Eisenberg et al., Computer Crimes, 50
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 681, 793 (2013) (“As the Internet is both a channel and
instrumentality of interstate commerce, it falls under the Commerce Clause’s
broad power.”); Peter J. Karol, The Constitutional Limitation on Trademark
Propertization, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1065, 1076 (2015) (“Congress can regulate
the channels of interstate commerce, such as the nation’s highways, waterways,
airways, and Internet.”).
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provisions of the federal law may cover these securities. For
example, in the absence of the application of the federal securities
law to virtual securities, the federal wire fraud statute may apply
to fraudulent behavior relating to securities existing entirely in
virtual space. 210 But, expanding the federal securities law beyond
its intended metes and bounds to cover securities in virtual space
is not appropriate.
In addition, expanding the scope of federal securities law when
questions exist as to whether it was intended to apply to securities
existing entirely within virtual space is especially inappropriate
because violations of this law can be prosecuted criminally, 211 and
as a result, the rule of lenity should be applied. 212 The rule of lenity
provides that in interpreting an ambiguous criminal statute, the
court should construe any ambiguity in favor of the defendant. 213
210. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012)
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or
causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs,
signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both.
211. See 15 U.S.C. § 77x (providing criminal penalties for violating the
Securities Act); id. § 78ff (providing criminal penalties for violating the provisions
of the Exchange Act).
212. See Patricia J. Falk, A Curious Omission from Ohio’s Rape Statute:
Sexual Assault When the Victim Consents to Medical or Dental Drugging, 82 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1123, 1137 (2014) (“The rule of lenity provides that if a criminal
statute is ambiguous, then that ambiguity must be resolved on the side of the
criminal defendant.”); Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference,
58 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 10 (2006) (“The rule of lenity complements the vagueness
doctrine by providing that when a criminal statute is ambiguous, rather than
vague, courts should resolve the ambiguity in the favor of the narrower scope of
criminal liability.”); Benjamin B. Nelson, Regulation or Prohibition? The Troubled
Legal Status of Internet Gambling Casinos in the United States in the Wake of the
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS
L. 39, 47 (2007) (“The ‘rule of lenity’ complements the vagueness doctrine by
providing that when a criminal statute is ambiguous, courts should resolve the
ambiguity in favor of the narrower scope of criminal liability.”).
213. See Patricia L. Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1472
(2016) (“[T]he rule of lenity instructs a court facing an ambiguous statute to
choose the construction that favors the defendant.”); Phillip M. Spector, The
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The history of the rule of lenity extends back to English common
law, as a means of preserving the rights of criminal defendants. 214
The rule of lenity also has roots in the United States Constitution
within the Due Process Clause, which requires that individuals
have clear notice of the criminal offenses of which they might be
prosecuted. 215
Because uncertainty exists as to whether securities existing
entirely within virtual space are covered by federal securities law,
the rule of lenity dictates that coverage not be extended to these
securities. When the Internet is being used strictly as a tool for
communication, similar to a telephone or radio, the drafters of the
federal securities law intended that body of law to apply. When
Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 511–12 (2002)
The rule of lenity counsels that criminal laws should be narrowly
interpreted in favor of criminal defendants. Identified as one of the
oldest and most ‘venerable’ canons of statutory interpretation, the rule
of lenity is employed by federal courts reluctant to participate in the
expansion of an already overzealous federal criminal regime.
Glen Staszewski, Constitutional Dialogue in a Republic of Statutes, 2010 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 837, 857 (“The rule of lenity provides that ambiguous criminal statutes
should be interpreted narrowly in favor of the accused based on constitutional
principles of fair notice and a desire to limit the scope of discretionary authority
that is delegated to prosecutors and judges.”).
214. See Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90
B.U. L. REV. 109, 128–29 (2010) (“The maxim that penal statutes should be
narrowly construed is one of the oldest canons of interpretation . . . . Schooled in
the English tradition, American judges applied the principle of lenity from the
start.”); Patricia J. Chapman, Has the Chevron Doctrine Run Out of Gas? Senza
Ripieni Use of Chevron Deference or the Rule of Lenity, 19 MISS. C. L. REV. 115,
141 (1998) (“[T]he rule of lenity developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries as the result of severe English Parliament legislative mandates . . . .”);
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885,
897 (2004) (“The rule of lenity has its oldest origins in the efforts of common law
courts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to limit the brutality of
English criminal law.”).
215. See William Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1007, 1029 (1989) (“The rule of lenity rests upon the due process value
that government should not punish people who have no reasonable notice that
their activities are criminally culpable . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 332 (2000) (“The rule of lenity is inspired by the
due process constraint on conviction pursuant to open-ended or vague statutes.”);
Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own Path, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 525 (2011) (“The rule of lenity sounds in a due process-based
concern about clear notice about the scope of a criminal statute.”).

SECURITIES REGULATION IN VIRTUAL SPACE

1443

virtual spaces are created, however, that is a different context than
the drafters of the federal securities law intended. 216 Extending the
application of federal securities law to that context creates both
rule of lenity and due process concerns, and as a result, such
extension is not permissible.
Extending the application of federal securities law to
securities existing entirely within virtual space also creates
separation of powers concerns. Under the United States
Constitution, the legislative branch enacts the law;217 the
executive branch enforces the law; 218 and the judicial branch
interprets the law. 219 Although the creation of the administrative
state has created some blurring among these branches and their
respective functions, this separation of power remains the law of
the United States.220 Historically, the Supreme Court of the United
States has shown some willingness to encroach upon the role of the
legislature in regard to securities regulation, as evidenced most
prominently by the creation of an implied private right of action
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when Congress did not provide
for the existence of such a right. 221 The current Supreme Court,
216. See Part V.A (discussing the intended scope of the federal securities law).
217. See U.S. CONST. art. I (defining the scope of the legislative branch of the
United States federal government).
218. See id. art. II (defining the scope of the executive branch of the United
States federal government).
219. See id. art. III (defining the scope of the judicial branch of the United
States federal government).
220. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to
Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J.
1920, 1938 (2014) (“The rise of the administrative state has long fueled concerns
about the aggrandizement of executive power and the attendant demise of the
separation of powers and checks and balances within the federal government.”);
John C. Roberts, The Struggle Over Executive Appointments, 2014 UTAH L. REV.
725, 751 (“[The Supreme Court] has approved the transfer to executive offices and
independent agencies of the power to create binding legislative rules and to
adjudicate cases involving private parties. Without this modification of the
traditional three branch governmental structure, the administrative state as we
know it would be impossible.”); Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69
STAN. L. REV. 359, 377 (2017) (“[T]he administrative state exercises a combination
of all three powers of government—legislative, executive, and . . . judicial.”).
221. See Eric C. Chaffee, An Oak Is an Oak Is an Oak Is an Oak: The
Disappointing Entrenchment in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund of the
Implied Private Right of Action Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 9 N.Y.U. J.
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i.e., the Roberts Court, however, has been conservative in
interpreting the scope of the federal securities law. The Roberts
Court has been unwilling either to expand or contract the scope of
federal securities law beyond the metes and bounds established by
Congress and the Court’s previous case law.222
Because substantial reason exists to doubt that Congress
intended the federal securities law to apply to securities in virtual
worlds and the virtual elements of augmented reality games,
courts should respect the separation of powers established by the
United States Constitution and leave that issue to Congress,
rather than extending federal securities regulation into a context
that it was not intended to cover. Interpreting the term “security”
in the Securities Act and Exchange Act to cover securities existing
entirely within virtual space will create an unauthorized
expansion of federal law, which is not appropriate.
C. Avoiding the Hindering of Creativity
The intended scope of federal securities regulation and various
constitutional law principles suggest that securities existing
entirely within virtual space should be excluded from the
definition of a security for purposes of application of federal
securities law. However, other policy reasons exist for reaching the
L. & LIBERTY 92, 94 (2015) (“[T]he continued existence and modification of the
implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is an affront to
Article I, section 7 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to pass
laws, not courts.”); Michael J. Kaufman, Mending the Weathered Jurisdictional
Fences in the Supreme Court’s Securities Fraud Decisions, 49 SMU L. REV. 159,
221 (1996) (“Viewed as a whole, the Supreme Court’s securities fraud cases
actually have flaunted the will of Congress. The Court initially permitted an
expansion of its jurisdiction to entertain judicially-created private remedies
where Congress had refused to do so.”).
222. See generally Eric C. Chaffee, The Supreme Court as Museum Curator:
Securities Regulation and the Roberts Court, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 847 (2017)
(analogizing the Roberts Court to a museum curator in the area of federal
securities regulation because of the Court’s unwillingness to expand or contract
the scope of federal securities law beyond the scope of existing legislation and
Supreme Court precedent). See A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts
Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 107 (2011) (“The majority of
the decisions of Roberts Court [relating to securities regulation] . . . if anything
show a bias toward the status quo.”).
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same conclusion. These reasons are all rooted in the notion that
subjecting these securities to federal securities regulation will
hinder creativity in various unpalatable ways, such as by impeding
the growth and evolution of virtual space, preventing regulatory
experimentation, and interfering with the positive aspects of play.
Subjecting virtual space to federal securities regulation will
prevent the growth and evolution of these environments. One of
the most exciting things about video games, virtual worlds, virtual
reality, and augmented reality is that they allow software
developers the opportunity to reimagine existence and allow users
to explore new domains and engage in new social interactions. 223
Subjecting these media to federal securities law means that these
environments become constrained by a complex and at times
onerous body of regulation. 224 Of course, one option for preventing
this is severing the connection between virtual space and real
world money. However, this solution limits creativity and the
223. See Miriam A. Cherry, The Global Dimensions of Virtual Work, 54 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 471, 487 (2010) (“[O]ne of the most exciting elements of virtual
worlds is the new technology allowing people to interact with each other even
when separated by great distance. Expertise will no longer be bounded by
geographical constraints, which will encourage cross-border collaborations and
engagements to flourish.”); Albert C. Lin, Virtual Consumption: A Second Life for
Earth?, 2008 BYU L. REV. 47, 111 (“[V]irtual worlds offer far more excitement,
with increasingly powerful graphic capabilities, than the video games of
yesteryear.”); Ryan Vacca, Viewing Virtual Property Ownership Through the Lens
of Innovation, 76 TENN. L. REV. 33, 64 (2008) (“Considering the relatively new and
exciting development of virtual worlds that is upon us, the creative developments
occurring each day within the worlds, and the new sources of entertainment and
cultural growth available from them, we should seize the opportunity to maximize
this creativity and innovation.”).
224. See Donald C. Langevoort, United States Securities Regulation and
Global Competition, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 191, 192 (2008) (“Various
well-publicized, bipartisan blue-ribbon committee reports have criticized U.S.
securities regulation for being unduly cumbersome, and, in part, blamed
overregulation for a loss of competitiveness in the global capital marketplace.”);
Pritchard, supra note 217, at 106 (“To outsiders, securities law is not all that
interesting. The body of the law consists of an interconnecting web of statutes and
regulations that fit together in ways that are decidedly counter-intuitive.
Securities law rivals tax law in its reputation for complexity and dreariness.”);
Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 544 (2010)
(“Securities regulations can be onerous, requiring registration before a
corporation can take a certain action, such as offering for sale a new class or series
of securities (stock) in the company.”).
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potential evolution of virtual space in ways that may be interesting
and in some instances socially beneficial.
Applying federal securities law to virtual space prevents
regulatory experimentation. A number of commentators have
noted the benefits of regulatory experimentation and diversity in
regard to securities regulation. 225 The problem is that patchwork
regulation does not work in regard to regulating markets as
evidenced by the failure of state securities law to prevent the stock
market crash of 1929 prior to the enactment of a system of federal
securities regulation. 226 The patchwork of state blue sky laws
needed to be replaced by a system of federal securities regulation
to restore investor confidence and create strong and relatively
stable securities markets.227 Securities markets are now becoming
225. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
903, 950 (1998) (“[R]egulatory competition among countries will benefit investors
and capital markets.”); Kelli A. Alces, Legal Diversification, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1977, 2010 (2013) (“[A]n investor can diversify among different kinds of securities
by considering the important legal protections each kind of security offers and
showing how those legal features can be profitable in different circumstances.”);
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2361 (1998) (“This Article contends that the
current legislative approach to securities regulation is mistaken and that
preemption is not the solution to frivolous lawsuits. It advocates instead a
market-oriented approach of competitive federalism that would expand, not
reduce, the role of the states in securities regulation.”).
226. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 18 (6th ed.
2009) (“Following the enactment of the early state securities laws, federal
legislation was successfully resisted for a while. However, the stock market crash
of 1929 is properly described as the straw that broke the camel’s back. The era
that followed ushered in federal securities regulation.”); Christine Lazaro &
Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented Regulation of Investment Advice: A Call
for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. Rev. 47, 52–53 (2014)
(“Securities regulation within the United States began at the state level. State
laws creating liability for securities fraud, known as blue sky laws, first appeared
in the 1910s . . . . Even though most states soon passed their own blue sky laws,
state-by-state regulation proved ineffective.”); Rose, supra note 40, at 1376 (“[T]he
New Deal Congress believed that state securities laws—known as “Blue Sky
Laws”—had been ineffective in deterring abuses that contributed to the Stock
Market Crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression.”).
227. See Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign
Issuers: How the U.S. Regulatory Regime Is Affecting the United States’ Historic
Position as the World’s Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 109
(2006) (“Since World War II, the United States has been the world’s principal
capital market. This market has been uniquely broad and deep, with substantial
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global,228 and as a result, more harmonization and centralization
is needed to limit future economic crises. 229 Moreover, the SEC’s
Office of International Affairs’ International Technical Assistance
Program has been very good at exporting the United States’
theories of securities market regulation abroad. 230 In recent years,
the Program has provided training to approximately two-thousand
regulators in more than one hundred countries. 231 All of this means
that experimentation and diversity relating to securities
regulation is likely to become less and less common.
retail participation by individual investors and small institutions, plentiful
capital for equity financing and a willingness to hold long-term debt
securities . . . .”); C. Nicholas Revelos, Transnational Securities Regulation: Can
U.S. Investors Have Their Cake and Eat It Too?, 3 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 87, 87 (1994)
(“For many years, the U.S. securities markets were essentially the only game in
the world.”).
228. See MARC I. STEINBERG, FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ & ERIC C. CHAFFEE,
GLOBAL ISSUES IN SECURITIES LAW, at iii (2013) (“Turn on the CNBC or Bloomberg
cable channels during the middle of the night in the United States and one quickly
realizes that securities markets are global and that what goes on in European or
Asian markets spills over into the United States.”); Edward F. Greene, Beyond
Borders: Time to Tear Down the Barriers to Global Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J.
85, 85 (2007) (“There can be no argument that the securities markets are now
global . . . .”); Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure
Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 128 (2004)
(“Securities markets are increasingly global.”).
229. Elsewhere, I have written extensively on the benefits of harmonization
and centralization of international securities law. See generally Chaffee, supra
note 37; Chaffee, supra note 8; Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the Bottom:
An Argument for Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities
Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1581 (2010); Eric C. Chaffee, The
Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United States Government’s
Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187 (2010);
Eric C. Chaffee, A Moment of Opportunity: Reimagining International Securities
Regulation in the Shadow of Financial Crisis, 15 NEXUS 29 (2010); Eric C.
Chaffee, A Panoramic View of the Financial Crisis that Began in 2008: The Need
for Domestic and International Regulatory Reform, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2009).
230. See Securities and Exchange Commission’s International Technical
Assistance Program, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/oia_emergtech.shtml (last updated Apr. 8, 2014) (last visited
Sept. 21, 2017) (“Utilizing a faculty of senior SEC and industry officials, and
seasoned practitioners, the technical assistance program provides training to
nearly 2000 regulatory and law enforcement officials from over 100 countries.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
231. See id. (providing an overview of the SEC’s Office of International Affairs’
International Technical Assistance Program).
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Virtual space offers an opportunity for regulatory
experimentation by the states and by the software developers,
platform owners, and users of these realms. The negative
consequences of a securities market crash in a virtual space
presents none of the risks of a securities market crash in the real
world. 232 Useful data can be collected in video games, virtual
worlds, virtual reality, and augmented reality, and it can help
improve the understanding of how securities markets and
regulation function and fail to function in the real world. Of course,
all of this assumes that the entire body of federal securities
regulation is not imposed upon all aspects of virtual space that
touch the United States. Such an approach is not desirable and
would be a genuine shame because of the potential lost
opportunities for experimentation and data collection.
Finally, applying federal securities law to securities existing
entirely within virtual space would also impede the positive
aspects of play. Play has numerous psychological benefits. 233
Unnecessarily saddling virtual space with securities law—a
difficult and at times overwhelming body of regulation—would
create a harmful restriction on certain types of play. This is
especially true because Congress never intended federal securities
regulation to apply to this context, and various constitutional
doctrines prohibit extending federal securities regulation into
these virtual realms.

232. See Arthur Acevedo, How Sarbanes-Oxley Should Be Used to Expose the
Secrets of Discretion, Judgment, and Materiality of the Auditor’s Report, 4
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 6 (2005) (“Although the reasons for the 2001–2002
financial crisis differ from those that caused the 1929 stock market crash, the
economic and social consequences are similar—namely, unemployment, lost
fortunes, mistrust, and lack of investor confidence.”); Tracey M. Roberts,
Brackets: A Historical Perspective, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 925, 934 (2014) (“The 1929
stock market crash heralded the onset of the Great Depression; bank failures,
price deflation, unemployment, foreclosures, and a 50% drop in industrial output
reduced tax revenues significantly.”).
233. See Isabela Granic, Adam Lobel & Rutger C.M.E. Engels, The Benefits of
Playing Video Games, 69 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 66, 76 (2014) (“After pulling together
the research findings on the benefits of video games, we have become particularly
inspired by the potential that these games hold for interventions that promote
well-being, including the prevention and treatment of mental health problems in
youth.”).
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VI. The Arguments for Applying Federal Securities Regulation to
Securities Existing Entirely in Virtual Space
A strong case exists for determining that securities existing in
virtual space should not be subject to federal securities law
because their “context . . . requires” 234 that they be excluded from
the definition of a security. Still, a number of persuasive, but not
prevailing, counterarguments exist for applying federal securities
law. These counterarguments include that application of federal
securities law is necessary for investor protection, is required to
prevent an unworkable patchwork of state regulation, and is
needed to ensure that these rapidly developing and evolving
virtual environments are properly regulated. Although some of
these counterarguments are valid, the case against applying
federal securities law is stronger.
A. Virtual Investor Protection
In regard to the application of federal securities regulation to
virtual space, although Congress’s primary reason for enacting the
Securities Act and Exchange Act was to protect the securities
markets, protecting investors was an important goal as well. 235
The system of federal securities regulation in the United States is
well-developed and provides a high level of investor protection. 236
234. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a), 78c(a) (2012).
235. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC’s Global Accounting Vision: A
Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1, 43 (2008) (“In the
United States, investor protection is among the principal purposes of securities
regulation . . . .”); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the
Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities
Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 204 (2006) (“One of the fundamental purposes
of securities regulation is to promote investor confidence and provide investor
protection.”); Nitzan Shilon, CEO Stock Ownership Policies—Rhetoric and
Reality, 90 IND. L.J. 353, 400 (2015) (“Protecting investors by providing them with
critical information about their investments is the basic purpose behind securities
regulation.”).
236. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Role of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
Other Transnational Anti-Corruption Laws in Preventing or Lessening Future
Financial Crises, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1314 (2012) (“Congress . . . enact[ed]
a robust and comprehensive system of securities regulation with the passage of
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to restore
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If this body was extended into virtual space, investors within these
environments would receive the benefits of this system of
regulation.
Although extending the reach of federal securities regulation
to virtual space might be tempting, it would not be the right choice.
The intended scope of federal securities regulation, various
constitutional law principles, and concerns about hindering
creativity and regulatory experimentation provide reasons why a
court should determine that the “context . . . requires” that federal
securities regulation not apply.237 Securities regulation is not
supposed to be all things to all people. As cases such as Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green 238 evidence, the Supreme Court has held
that federal securities regulation should not be co-opted for uses
that it was not intended. 239 In that case, the Court refused to use
the private right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to
remedy an allegedly abusive short-form merger that did not
involve a misrepresentation or manipulation because the matter
should have been addressed using state corporate law.240 Though
it might be tempting for a court to apply the federal securities law
to regulate securities existing entirely in virtual space, a court
public confidence and remove the specter of fraud and corruption.”); Stephen
Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV.
279, 280 (2000) (“The present securities regulatory regime in the United States
focuses on the protection of investors. Investor protection, in turn, leads to a
robust capital market.”); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Kathy Fogel & Rwan El-Khatib,
Running the D.C. Circuit Gauntlet on Cost-Benefit Analysis after Citizens United:
Empirical Evidence from Sarbanes-Oxley and the JOBS Act, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 135, 138 (2014) (reporting that some commentators argue “timely,
robust disclosures and other securities regulations are precisely the reason that
the American securities markets are the market of choice for investors around the
world”).
237. See supra Part V (providing arguments for not applying federal securities
regulation to securities existing entirely within virtual space).
238. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
239. See id. at 477 (refusing to recognize a private right of action under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when such an action is “unnecessary to ensure the
fulfilment of Congress’ purposes in adopting the [Exchange] Act” (internal
quotations omitted)).
240. See id. (holding that plaintiffs could not proceed with a private right of
action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of a misrepresentation,
in part because “[t]he result would be to bring within the Rule a wide variety of
corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation”).
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should not reach that holding because of separation of powers
concerns. 241 If the determination is to be made that federal
securities regulation applies to these securities, that decision
should be left to Congress because it is the body with the power to
create law and because Congress could regulate virtual space in
most instances under the Interstate Commerce Clause. 242 Even
though Congress has the power to regulate most, if not all, virtual
space, it should not promulgate such regulation because, as
discussed above, applying federal securities law to securities
existing entirely within virtual space would hinder creativity by
impeding the growth and evolution of such space—by preventing
regulatory experimentation and by interfering with the positive
aspects of play. 243
In short, investor protection is not a persuasive enough reason
to apply federal securities regulation to virtual space because it is
not appropriate, and beyond that, it is not necessary. The
regulation of these virtual realms should be left to other provisions
of federal law, state law, and self-regulation.

241. See Christopher T. Cline, Perspectives of a Non-Party to the International
Criminal Court Treaty, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110 (2008)
(“[T]he U.S. system of government is founded on the principle of checks and
balances, with each branch of government—legislative, executive, judicial—
fulfilling a role. Congress passes the laws, the executive enforces the laws, and
the courts interpret the laws.”); Jesse W. Markham, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New
Implied Repeal Doctrine: Expanding Judicial Power to Rewrite Legislation Under
the Ballooning Conception of “Plain Repugnancy”, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 437, 466
(2010) (“Even where a court concludes that a statute is simply a bad idea or that
it works poorly in practice, the judicial role is limited and does not include
remedying even the most ill-considered legislation by repealing it or rewriting
it to conform to the court’s better judgment.”); Lance McMillan, The Proper Role
of Courts: The Mistakes of Leegin, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 405, 459 (“By design, the
legislative and judicial functions are separated along distinct lines in the
Constitution. Congress passes laws; the federal courts interpret them.”).
242. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes”); see also supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing that
the Internet is both a channel and an instrumentality of interstate commerce).
243. See supra Part V.C (arguing that federal securities regulation should not
apply to securities existing entirely within virtual space because it would hinder
creativity by impeding the growth and evolution of virtual space, preventing
regulatory experimentation, and interfering with the positive aspects of play).
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B. The Difficulties of Patchwork State Regulation

One of the benefits of federalized securities law is that it
creates a relatively consistent floor for regulation of securities
across the United States.244 In the event that federal securities law
is not applied to virtual space, a patchwork of regulation will be
created because the regulation of these securities existing entirely
within virtual space will fall largely to the states and to
self-regulation by those owning and acting within these virtual
environments. Of course, some federal provisions will still be
available to punish bad behavior within virtual space, such as the
wire fraud statute, 245 but regulation is going to be far from
uniform. This creates two concerns, market instability and
hindering the development of virtual space. Both these concerns
are valid but are outweighed by the detriments of applying federal
securities law to these virtual realms.
In regard to market instability, in the absence of a uniform
system of securities regulation in virtual space, users may be
unwilling to participate in these securities markets. As noted
above, Congress enacted federal securities regulation in the United
States to restore investor confidence in the wake of the Stock
Market Crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression after the
failure of the patchwork of blue sky laws to provide an effective
level of regulation.246 If market crashes and fraud become rampant
within virtual environments, users may no longer be willing to
244. See Romano, supra note 220, at 2365 (“While the federal laws do not
preempt all state regulation, states cannot lower the regulatory standards
applicable to firms covered by the federal regime because its requirements are
mandatory.” (footnotes omitted)).
245. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012)
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or
causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs,
signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme
or artifice, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both.
246. See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text (discussing the initial
passage of blue sky laws in the United States and their subsequent inability to
prevent the stock market crash of 1929).
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participate in virtual markets. The short answer is that this is not
a problem. Real world national economies, real world businesses,
and real world people depend on the existence of viable real world
capital markets. 247 The same is not true of virtual securities
markets. Moreover, stock market crashes and fear of fraud within
some virtual environments may not spill over into other virtual
environments. In fact, how virtual markets interact among virtual
realms would be an interesting question to answer.
A second concern about creating a patchwork of regulation is
that it may hinder the development of virtual space. If software
developers are required to comply with a patchwork of regulation
across the United States, these developers may never bring their
creations to market, or they may eliminate the securities contained
within them. Perhaps, this is not a bad thing because it could
prevent users of virtual environments from having their money
stolen from them. Still, the regulation of technology can often
hinder the beneficial growth and evolution of that technology. 248
Regardless, this does not justify applying federal securities
regulation to virtual space. The virtual context requires that
federal securities law not be applied because of the intended scope
of federal securities regulation, various constitutional law
principles, and concerns about hindering creativity.249 Even if
adhering to a patchwork of regulation will create compliance
247. See Bernard S. Black, The First International Merger Wave (and the Fifth
and Last U.S. Wave), 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 799, 810 (2000) (“Most of the U.S.
population understands, more or less, the connection between the soaring stock
market and overall prosperity . . . .”); James R. Doty, The Relevance, Role, and
Reliability of Audits in the Global Economy, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1891, 1893 (2012)
(“Many factors contribute to American prosperity, but a significant one is that our
public securities markets provide a reliable funding mechanism for American
and, increasingly, foreign businesses.”).
248. See J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, FTC Consumer Protection
at 100: 1970s Redux or Protecting Markets to Protect Consumers?, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 2157, 2223 (2015) (“Regulation based on speculative problems, however,
is far more likely to chill useful innovations than it is to prevent real harms.”);
Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access,
22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 19–20 (2008) (“Blind application of a regulatory regime
developed for a different technology and different market conditions can lead to
regulation that lacks any theoretical justification and can impede technological
innovation and consumer welfare.”).
249. See supra Part V (providing arguments for not applying federal securities
regulation to securities existing entirely within virtual space).
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complexities and potentially hinder the development of virtual
space, this does not justify the application of federal securities law.
C. The Rapid Development and Evolution of Virtual Space
One of the most exciting things about virtual space is that it
is rapidly developing and rapidly evolving. 250 One argument for the
application of federal securities regulation to securities existing
entirely within virtual space is that regulation is needed to ensure
that a growing and expanding realm is subject to some cohesive
system of law.
This argument is flawed. Just because a body of law could be
applied to a particular context does not mean that it should be
applied to a particular context. As discussed in the previous Part,
the intended scope of federal securities regulation, various
constitutional law principles, and concerns about hindering
creativity all provide reason why a court should determine that the
“context . . . requires” that federal securities regulation not
apply. 251 Because of the ubiquity and anonymity of the Internet
and its relationship to virtual space, concerns definitely exist about
how this space may develop. However, this does not mean that
ill-suited bodies of law should be super-imposed upon it. In the
event that this space evolves in ways that merit regulation under
the federal securities law, Congress can make that decision then.
As it stands, application of federal securities regulation is not
warranted.

250. See Michael Cerrati, Video Game Music: Where It Came From, How It Is
Being Used Today, and Where It Is Heading Tomorrow, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 293, 394 (2006) (“The dynamic and constantly-evolving creativity contributing
to the design and development of today’s games has helped establish the video
game industry as a multi-billion dollar revenue force now attracting worldwide
attention.”).
251. See supra Part V (providing arguments for not applying federal securities
regulation to securities existing entirely within virtual space).
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VII. Conclusion
Virtual space existing within video games, virtual worlds,
virtual reality, and augmented reality has become a regular part
of most peoples’ lives. 252 As with any technology-related
advancement, new legal issues have been created as to how to
apply and adapt law to this virtual space. The question regarding
the application of federal securities regulation to virtual space is
an interesting one that has not received significant academic
treatment.253 If securities existing entirely within virtual space are
determined to be securities for purposes of federal securities law,
software developers, platform owners, and users become subject to
the registration requirements and anti-fraud provisions of that
body of law, along with the rest of its provisions. 254 Based upon a
strict reading of the definition of a security found within the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, securities can exist entirely
within virtual space because investment contracts, a type of
security, can be created in such space. 255 However, because the
definition sections found in the Securities Act and Exchange Act
both begin with the prefatory language, “unless the context
otherwise requires,” 256 one must consider whether these securities,
in the context of virtual space, should be excluded from the
application of federal securities law. Based upon the intended
scope of federal securities regulation, various constitutional law
principles, and concerns about hindering creativity and regulatory
experimentation, the virtual context requires that securities
existing entirely within virtual space be excluded from the

252. See supra Part II.A (providing a brief overview of virtual space in various
media, including video games, virtual worlds, virtual reality, and augmented
reality).
253. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing that the
scholarship relating to the application of federal securities regulation to virtual
space is very limited).
254. See supra Part III (providing a brief overview of federal securities
regulation, including the definition of a security, registration requirements, and
anti-fraud provisions).
255. See supra Part IV.D (examining the application of federal securities
regulation to securities existing entirely within virtual space).
256. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a), 78c(a) (2012).
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application of federal securities law. 257 Various concerns exist
regarding excluding such securities from the application of federal
securities law. These concerns include whether the application of
federal securities regulation is necessary for investor protection, is
required to prevent an unworkable patchwork of state regulation,
and is needed to ensure that these rapidly developing and evolving
virtual environments are properly regulated.258 Ultimately, the
arguments for excluding such securities from the application of
federal securities law outweigh the arguments for applying federal
securities law.
Virtual space is rapidly developing and evolving in exciting
ways in a variety of media, including video games, virtual worlds,
virtual reality, and augmented reality. As a result, a plethora of
new issues have been created that need to be considered and
addressed. In regard to securities regulation, considering these
issues now, rather than when they arise later, is important.
Software developers, platform owners, and users need to have
their rights and obligations clarified to allow maximum freedom
for working in virtual space. Such an approach will allow virtual
space to develop in exciting and useful ways without being weighed
down by systems of regulation, such as federal securities law, that
should not and need not apply to such virtual environments.

257. See supra Part V (providing arguments for not applying federal securities
regulation to securities existing entirely within virtual space).
258. See supra Part VI (providing arguments for applying federal securities
regulation to securities existing entirely within virtual space).

